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This article is a systematic review of proposed section 43(c ). Proposed section 43(c ) would create a federal
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practical implications and theoretical underpinnings of the dilution concept. Part II describes the basic origins
and history of the dilution debate. Part IV(A) presents the practical problems that proposed section 43(c )
raises. Part IV(B) critiques some of the more popular theoretical justifications that are typically used to
support granting intellectual property rights and concludes that no satisfactory theoretical justification exists
to warrant an expansive federal dilution statute. The article concludes that because there is no serious
philosophical ground for dilution and because of the practical problems presented by section 43(c ), a federal
dilution statute is not only unnecessary but also counter-productive to clear, rational consideration of
legitimate trademark concerns.
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I. Introduction 
In 1988 as part of the Trademark Revision Act, l the Lanham 
Act was nearly amended to include a federal cause of action for 
trademark dilution. This amendment would have been codified as 
a new section 43(c).2 The amendment was ultimately removed 
from the final bill because concerns were raised in the House that 
the bill would impinge upon the First Amendment rights of adver-
tisers.3 This has not deterred dilution proponents from pushing 
ahead with the proposed legislation.4 In fact, a new federal dilu-
tion statute now seems imminent both in the United States5 and 
Britain.6 However, the potential significance that such an amend-
1 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3985 
(1988). The Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, 
1123-1127 (1989). 
2 See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
3 See H.R. REp. No. 100-1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). See also Jerome Gil-
son, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is it Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REp. 108, 114-15 (1993); Paul 
C. Van Slyke, State Laws Against Trademark Dilution: \-Wiy They Should Not Be Preempted by 
the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REp. 197, 198 (1993). 
There is some evidence of trademark owners attempting to apply dilution stat-
utes in non-commercial settings, thereby infringing upon First Amendment rights. 
See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d. 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the application of Maine's dilution statute to a non-commercial parody of trade-
mark violated First Amendment). 
4 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 3, at 108; Kimbley L. Muller, A Position of Advocacy in 
Support of Adoption of a Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83 TRADEMARK REp. 175 
(1993); Laura M. Slenzak, Dilution Law in the United States and Canada: A Review of the 
State of the Law and a Proposal for United States Federal Dilution Protection, 83 TRADEMARK 
REp. 205 (1993). 
5 Gilson, supra note 3, at 116 (noting that an ABA committee voted overwhelm-
ingly in support of including a dilution section in the Lanham Act). 
6 A bill is currently pending before the British Parliament that would effectively 
prohibit dilution; however, the bill does not use the word "dilution." Telephone In-
terview with Stephen Jones, Esq. of Boodle, Hatfield in London (Mar. 30, 1994). It is 
important to point out that these amendments to the British trademark law would go 
even further than proposed section 43(c) because they would also prohibit registra-
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ment would have on trademark law in this country is extreme and 
warrants further serious thought and consideration. 
Dilution 7 is variously and vaguely defined as the "whittling 
away"B of a trademark's distinctive capabilities, or as a "cancer-like 
growth ... which feeds upon the reputation of an established dis-
tinctive trademark."g The typical state dilution statute grants in-
junctive relief to the holder of a trademark regardless of confusion 
among consumers and regardless of whether the mark was 
registered. 10 
Because proposed section 43 (c) grossly expands trademark 
rights, and expansion is only justified by a now out-dated and dis-
credited version of natural rights, such an amendment is not wise. 
In fact, this "unnatural" expansion of trademark rights would chill 
the development of trademark rights by others and shift the bal-
ance of protection of interests strongly in favor of the trademark 
tion of marks that "are not similar to those for which the earlier mark is protected." 
[d. 
Furthermore, this trend toward granting more expansive trademark rights may 
be only the beginning. The British bill is in response to the European Harmonization 
Directive on Trademarks Articles 4(1)(b), 4(4)(a), 5(I)(b), and 5(2). /d. 
I am indebted to Mr. Stephen Jones, Esq. of Boodle, Hatfield in London for his 
assistance in regards to this footnote. 
7 I should first point out that, herein, I conform to the "newspeak" of trademarks. 
What I refer to as "dilution" is often referred to as "anti-dilution." Some have advo-
cated that the "anti" should be dropped because one does not say "anti-infringement" 
when speaking of infringement. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 109. I conform to this 
newspeak, not for the reasons advocated by Gilson, but rather because when I say 
"anti-dilution" I mean that I am opposed to the enactment of a dilution statute and 
"anti anti-dilution" is a bit convoluted. 
B Frank I. Schechter, The Ratitmal Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 
813,825 (1927). 
9 Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 
1165 (N.Y. 1977). There are actually several forms of dilution. This article addresses 
only pure dilution, not dilution by tarnishment, dilution by confusion, nor dilution by 
genericide. For an excellent critique of each of these, see David Welkowitz, Reexamin-
ing Trademark Dilutitm, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 546-65 (1991). 
10 See, e.g., the Illinois dilution statute which reads as follows: 
Every person ... using a mark, trade name label or form of advertisement 
may proceed by suit, and the circuit court shall grant injunctions, to en-
join subsequent use by another of the same or any similar mark, trade 
name, label or form of advertisement if there exists a likelihood of injury 
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, 
trade name, label, or form of advertisement of the prior user, notwith-
standing the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion 
as to the source of goods or services. . . . 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986). 
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holder at the expense of the consumer and uninvolved third 
parties. 
This article is a systematic review of proposed section 43(c). 
The article reviews both the practical implications and the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of the dilution concept. Part II presents the ac-
tual language of proposed section 43(c)Y Part III describes the 
basic origins and history of the dilution debate.12 Part IV(A) 
presents the practical problems that proposed section 43(c) 
raises. IS Part IV (B) critiques some of the more popular theoretical 
justifications that are typically used to support granting intellectual 
property rights and concludes that no satisfactory theoretical justi-
fication exists to warrant an expansive federal dilution statute. 14 
The Article concludes that because there is no serious philosophi-
cal grounding for dilution and because of the practical problems 
presented by section 43(c), a federal dilution statute is not only 
unnecessary but also counter-productive to clear, rational consider-
ation of legitimate trademark concerns. 
ll. Proposed Language of Section 43 (c) 
The International Trademark Association (ITA) 15 drafted the 
following language that constituted the proposed section 43(c): 
(1) The registrant ofa famous mark registered ... shall be enti-
tled, subject to the principles of equity, to an injunction against 
another's use in commerce of a mark, commencing after the 
registrant's mark becomes famous, which causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the registrant's mark .... In determining 
whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider 
factors such as, but not limited to: 
(a) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of 
the mark; 
(b) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connec-
tion with the goods and services; 
11 See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 21-81 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 82-150 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 151-267 and accompanying text. 
15 Previously known as the United States Trademark Association (USTA), this or-
ganization is a group of trademark attorneys and trademark owners that lobby for 
changes in trademark legislation and common law both in the United States and 
abroad. Most of their efforts are of the highest quality. 
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(c) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of 
the mark; 
(d) the geographical extent of the trading area in which 
the mark is used; 
(e) the channels of trade for the goods or services with 
which the registrant's mark is used; 
(f) the degree of recognition of the registrant'S mark in its 
and in the other's trading areas and channels of trade; and 
(g) the nature and extent of the use of the same or similar 
mark by third parties. 
(2) Remedies. The registrant shall be entitled only to injunc-
tive relief in an action brought under this subsection, unless the 
subsequent user willfully intended to trade on the registrant's 
reputation or to cause dilution of the registrant's mark. If such 
willful intent is proven, the registrant shall also be entitled to 
the remedies set forth in Sections 35(a) and 36, subject to the 
discretion of the court and the principles of equity. 16 
437 
The section of the Lanham Act that contains definitions17 would 
also be amended to define "dilution" as follows: "[t]he term 'dilution' 
means the lessening of the capacity of registrant's mark to identify 
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of (a) competition between parties, or (b) likelihood of confu-
sion, mistake or deception."18 
Subsequent to the submission of these proposed amendments to 
Congress, the ITA amended the Model State Trademark Bill. Most 
significantly, the ITA supplanted the word "owner" for the word "reg-
istrant," ostensibly to ensure that the state laws would protect even 
marks not registered in that particular state.19 Whether purposeful or 
not, this change amplifies the pro-property, monopolistic aspects of a 
federal dilution statute.20 
m. Origins of Dilution 
Although prior documentation of the concept exists,21 Frank 
16 The United States Trademark Ass'n Trademark Review Commission Report and &com-
mendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REp. 375, 458-59 
(1987) [hereinafter USTA Report]. 
17 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1989). 
18 USTA Report, supra note 16, at 459. 
19 Andrew Goldstein, Bringing the Model State Trademark BiU into the 90s and Beyond, 
83 TRADEMARK REp. 226, 236 (1993). 
20 See infra notes 151-99 and accompanying text. 
21 See Judgment of Sept. 11, 1924, Landgericht Elberfeld, 25 Juristiche Wochem-
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Schechter is generally given credit for raising the idea of dilution 
within the United States.22 Schechter's revolutionary claim was 
that trademarks themselves sell products and, therefore, trade-
marks themselves deserve protection.23 That is, Schechter's im-
plicit claim is that there is an unacceptable gap in trademark 
protection. 
Under standard trademark doctrine, trademark holders may 
enjoin the use of identical or similar marks only to the extent that a 
third party consumer is likely to be confused.24 If the consumer is 
not likely to be confused because, for example, there is no compe-
tition between the trademark holder and the subsequent user, by 
definition, confusion cannot occur and therefore no infringement 
exists.25 According to Schechter, this gap in trademark law was un-
acceptable, and it was to this gap that his radical thesis was 
directed.26 
Schechter's dilution concept is revolutionary within trademark 
jurisprudence because the common law of trademarks dictates that 
trademarks are only protected to the extent they are used on goods 
or services. The United States Supreme Court continues to rein-
force the common law principle of trademarks that only the prior 
appropriation and use of a mark is protected.27 Trademark hold-
ers do not actually "own" the underlying mark at issue,28 but 
rather, only possess a right to exclude others from using the mark 
in a manner that would confuse consumers.29 Therefore, 
schrift 502, XXV Markenschutz and Wettbewerb (M.U.R.) 264. See also Schechter, 
supra note 8, at 831 (discussion of Ddcl case). 
22 See Schechter, supra note 8, at 825. 
23 Id. at 831. 
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1989); 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1989). 
25 Schechter, supra note 8, at 825. 
26 Id. 
27 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
28 See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REv. 
519,553 (1993). 
29 The Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he mere fact that one person has 
adopted and used a trade-mark on his goods does not prevent the adoption and use 
of the same trade-mark by others on articles of a different description. There is no 
property in a trade-mark apart from the business or trade in connection with which it 
is employed." American Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926). This is 
why I refrain from using the terminology "trademark owner," but rather choose 
"trademark holder." Because there is no trademark to own, there can be no "trade-
mark owner." This may seem to be only a question of semantics; however, this inaccu-
rate use of terminology has had an impact in confusing courts' analysis of trademarks. 
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Schechter's claim that trademark protection should vastly extend 
beyond these clear parameters is contrary to traditional, accepted 
trademark jurisprudence. 
Under the urging of the ITA,30 many states have adopted dilu-
tion statutes starting with Massachusetts in 1947.31 The ITA even 
drafted and urged upon the states a model trademark dilution 
bill.32 Each of these state dilution statutes, heavily influenced by 
this model dilution statute, provides for injunctive relief for the 
trademark holder regardless of competition and confusion among 
the consumers. However, for roughly forty-seven years, essentially 
no court accepted the true expansive meaning of dilution as ex-
pressed in the state statutes. 
In 1932, a New York case granted relief on behalf of Tiffany's 
to enjoin a movie theater from using the TIFFANY trademark in 
association with its business.33 There the court applied the New 
York dilution statute and determined as actionable the "gradual 
whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the pub-
lic mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing 
goods."34 
Between 1930 and 1977, however, the courts remained uncon-
vinced and openly hostile to the concept of dilution even in light 
of the very clear mandates from state legislatures in the form of 
various dilution statutes.35 The only significant dilution develop-
For example, at least one court has defined trademarks as "a limited property right in 
a particular word." New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
306 (9th Cir. 1992). As will be made clear below, the trademark right is an exclusion-
ary right, not a property right in the word itself. See infra notes 151-99 and accompa-
nying text. 
30 Gilson, supra note 3, at 116. 
31 Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7(a), 1947 Mass. Acts 300, repealed by 1973 Acts, ch. 
897, § 2, replaced by MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1993). 
32 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 113. 
33 Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., 264 N.Y.S. 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 
A.D. 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932), afJ'd, 188 N.E. 30 (N.Y. 1933). 
34 [d. at 461-62 (citing Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 
40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 825 (1927». 
35 For example, the Delaware statute states: 
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the dis-
tinctive quality of a mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at 
common law or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for 
injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the 
parties, or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993). 
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ment during that time was Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.,36 where 
the Seventh Circuit, applying the Illinois dilution statute, found 
that the mark POlARAlD for use in connection with designing 
and installing heating and refrigeration systems diluted the mark 
POLAROID as used in cameras.37 The court stated that if the dilu-
tion statute "is not applicable to this situation, it is useless because 
it adds nothing to the established law of unfair competition. "38 
In 1977, however, the proponents of the dilution doctrine re-
ceived a much needed shot in the arm. In Allied Maintenance Corp. 
v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.,39 a New York court finally provided 
a judicial definition of dilution that appeared to dilution propo-
nents to be consistent with Schechter's understanding of the prob-
lem. In Allied Maintenance, the plaintiff used the mark ALLIED 
MAINTENANCE on or in connection with high-rise building main-
tenance services; the defendant used the identical mark on heat-
ing, ventilating and air conditioning services. Although the court 
did state that dilution was "a cancer-like growth" that ate away at 
the distinctive qualities of a trademark,40 the court went on to find 
that no dilution had occurred in this case because the mark AL-
LIED MAINTENANCE had not achieved the distinctive quality re-
quired for dilution statute protection. Therefore, dilution 
proponents who rely on Allied Maintenance as the turning point in 
which courts began seeing the light regarding dilution, actually 
rely on a case that found that no dilution had occurred. This case 
also erected one of the most formidable barriers to dilution relief: 
the requirement that the plaintiff's mark be somehow famous. 
Furthermore, as unscientific and mystifying as the court's defi-
nition of dilution in Allied Maintenance appears, a review of all of 
the trademark cases and commentary does not produce a better 
explanation or firmer philosophical justification for the existence 
of a federal dilution statute. In Allied Maintenance, the court of ap-
peals held that the statute was to be applied as written.41 More 
specifically, the court held that the dilution statute could support 
36 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963). 
37 Id. at 837. 
38 Id. 
39 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977). 
40 Id. at 1165. 
41 Id. 
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an injunction "notwithstanding the absence of . confusion."42 
Through this holding, proponents of dilution theory, but not 
courts, perceived a breath of new life. 
One of the primary dilution proponents, Jerome Gilson, 
claims that a growing number of courts are accepting dilution ra-
tionale to support an injunction.43 However, the objective status of 
dilution theory within the courts simply does not support such an 
expansive claim. 
Rather, courts have remained extremely hesitant to apply dilu-
tion theory, even after Allied Maintenance. Since 1977, the issue of 
trademark dilution has arisen 159 times in the federal circuit 
courts of appeal.44 Of those 159 cases, only forty-three cases con-
sidered dilution as more than just a "tack-on" cause of action. Of 
the original 159 cases, only ten cases resulted in a preliminary in-
junction with dilution as a partial ground (the other grounds being 
likelihood of confusion). Only four cases actually resulted in a sus-
tained injunction based solely on a dilution statute.45 Of those 
four, three were from Illinois-Jerome Gilson's home state! 
In the first of these four cases, Community Federal Savings and 
Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff,46 the Eleventh Circuit found that the de-
fendant's trademark COOKIE JAR used on topless go-go dancer 
entertainment services was likely to dilute the plaintiff's mark, 
COOKIE JAR, as used on automated teller machines. Even this 
case, however, is really not a pure dilution case. This case is clearly 
a case of tamishment where recovery should be possible if the 
plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of injury to business reputa-
tion.47 However, in Orondorff, the district court found only one pos-
sible instance of evidence of injury to business reputation. 
42 [d. 
43 Gilson, supra note 3, at Ill. 
44 Search of LEXIS, Mega library (Mar. 30, 1994). 
45 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chev-
rolet, 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988) (THE GREATEST USED CAR SHOW ON EARTH 
held to dilute THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal 
Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984), eert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (HYATT on 
legal services held to dilute HYATT on hotels); Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps 
League, 694 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1982) (use of SOUSA name or likeness on band 
awards dilutes JOHN PHILIP SOUSA BAND AWARD); Community Fed. Say. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034 (11th Cir. 1982) (use of COOKIE JAR by topless go-
go bar diluted bank's COOKIE1AR trademark for use on ATM). 
46 678 F.2d 1034 (11th Cir. 1982). 
47 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1988). 
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Apparently, the plaintiff presented evidence of a male customer at 
one of its ATM machines asking if the ATM card was good across 
the street at the defendant's establishment.48 
Also in 1982, the Seventh Circuit decided The Instrumentalist v. 
Marine Corps Lea[jll£.49 In that case, apparently almost over the ob-
jection of the plaintiff's attorney,50 the district court granted a pre-
liminary injunction based upon the Illinois dilution statute even 
though the plaintiff had not pleaded that cause of action and the 
parties had not briefed it.51 An interesting aside to this case is that 
the defendant, Marine Corps League, has absolutely nothing to do 
with the United States Marines.52 
In the third case, Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Seroices,53 the Sev-
enth Circuit ordered Hyatt Legal Services to change its name to 
avoid diluting Hyatt Corporation's mark. 54 Nevertheless, anyone 
who watches television in America knows that Joel Hyatt'S company 
is still known as HYATT LEGAL SERVICES. 
The Seventh Circuit stated that simply adding Mr. Hyatt's first 
name to create the name JOEL HYATT LEGAL SERVICES would 
be sufficient to avoid diluting the plaintiff's mark.55 If confusion is 
not necessary to issue an injunction under the statute, it seems odd 
that the court's remedy is based on a confusion approach. That is, 
the underlying premise in dilution rationale is that any non-com-
peting use of the mark will cause the original mark to lose its dis-
tinctiveness. Therefore,JOEL HYATT LEGAL SERVICES seems to 
dilute HYATI just as much as HYATT LEGAL SERVICES. The 
court, by requiring in its remedy that Joel Hyatt avoid confusion, 
inserted a standard trademark confusion analysis into its analysis 
even though confusion is not supposed to play a part in dilution 
analysis. To not require confusion to issue an injunction, but to 
require the defendant to avoid confusion to avoid an injunction, 
seems to intentionally obfuscate the purpose of dilution. 
The most recent case in which a federal circuit court has sus-
tained an injunction based on a dilution statute was Ringling Bros.-
48 678 F.2d at 1036 n.5. 
49 694 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1982). 
50 See Gilson, supra note 3, at Ill. 
51 Id. 
52 See Instrumentalist Co., 694 F.2d at 146 n.l. 
53 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984). 
54 Id. at 1159-60. 
55 Id. 
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Barnum & Bailey v. Celozzi-EtteLson.56 There the court held that the 
mark THE GREATEST USED CAR SHOW ON EARTH diluted 
THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH. Interestingly enough, the 
court claimed that the lack of a likelihood of confusion actually 
established the plaintiff's dilution claim.57 Without any evidence 
whatsoever, the court determined that dilution was "an infection 
which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising 
value of the mark. "58 The court sustained the injunction because 
dilution damages were unknowable and, therefore, irreparable. 
There are very few, if any, comparable areas of the law in our sys-
tem where an injunction is issued because of the plaintiff's inabil-
ity to specify damages. 
The dates of the four above-mentioned cases are 1982, 1984 
and 1988. This empirical, objective evidence simply does not sup-
port the claim that a "growing number" of courts are using dilution 
statutes to issue injunctions.59 In fact, there have been no dilution 
claims sustained in the federal circuit courts since 1988. 
One of the most recent cases regarding dilution is indicative 
of the courts' usual treatment of this issue. In Fruit of the Loom, Inc. 
v. Girouard,60 the Ninth Circuit held that FRUIT OF THE LOOM as 
used on underwear is not diluted by FRUIT CUPS as used on bus-
tiers or by FRUIT FLOPS as used on thongs. To arrive at this con-
clusion, the court applied a tortured bifurcation of the FRUIT OF 
THE LOOM mark,61 and held that because FRUIT alone was not 
56 855 F.2d 480 (7th CiT. 1988). 
57 Id. at 484. 
58 Id. (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830,836 (7th Cir. 1963». 
59 Gilson, supra note 3, at 111 n.7. See also Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or 
WiU-o'-the WisP?, 77 HARv. L. REv. 520,528 (1964) (noting that "[t]he persistence and 
ingenuity displayed by able federal judges in drawing the teeth of state dilution stat-
utes, as well as their firmness in insulating the common law of unfair competition 
from the dilution doctrine, must give pause to its advocates."). This perceptive state-
ment seems to be holding true even today. 
60 994 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1993). 
61 Such a bifurcated analysis is not warranted in this case. Courts are supposed to 
consider marks in their entirety. One can only speculate why this rather unique form 
of analysis was used to justify the result in this case, but it once again appears that a 
court is going to great extremes to avoid applying a dilution statute. The mark should 
be taken as a whole and compared to the mark of the alleged infringer or diluter on 
the whole. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 cmt. b (1938). The Restatement ex-
plains that "[s]imilarity of appearance is determined on the basis of the total effect of 
the designation, rather than on a comparison of individual features. While individual 
features may be dissimilar, the total effect may be one of similarity." Id. See also Mu-
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famous for underwear, it was not diluted by the defendant's use of 
the word "fruit" in it marks. 62 
As McCarthy seems to concede, establishing sufficient strength 
for dilution analysis is but a value judgment that is "difficult to 
make."63 Because this analysis is so subjective, there appears to be 
no clear rational basis for denying Fruit of the Loom's dilution 
claim. If the various dilution statutes add anything to the law of 
unfair competition, and especially if the California statute is to be 
applied to the "likelihood of injury to business reputation,"64 it is 
difficult to understand how FRUIT CUPS does not dilute FRUIT 
OF THE LOOM. 
Although twenty-five states have currently adopted dilution 
statutes65 and three states include dilution as part of their common 
law,66 since the Allied Maintenance decision in 1977, only one state 
tual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that courts 
should look to the overall effect of the mark and not just compare individual fea-
tures); InternationalJensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 825 (9th Cir. 
1993). Taken on the whole, no one can take issue with FRUIT OF THE LOOM being 
a famous mark. 
62 994 F.2d at 1363. 
63 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR CoMPETITION § 24:14, at 225 (2d 
ed. 1984). 
64 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1992). See also Century 21 Real Estate 
Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988). 
65 Twenty-five states now have trademark dilution statutes. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 
(1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1991); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 14330 
(West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11 (i) (c) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 1O-1-451(b) 
(Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-
Hurd 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 51:223.1 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1991); MAss. GEN. L. 
ch. 110B, § 12 (1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 30-13-334 (1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-122 (1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 
(1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1992); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-<1 (Mc-
Kinney 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 647.107 (1991); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1124 (1990); RI. 
GEN. LAws § 6-2-12 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1991); TEX. Bus. & CoM. 
CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West 1992); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.77.160 (1991). Most of these 
statutes are patterned after section 12 of the Model State Trademark Bill. BJ. Mead-
ows III, Trademark Dilution: Its Df!Veiopment, Japan '5 Experience, and the New USTA Federal 
Proposal, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 417, 425 (1988). For the text of the 
Model State Trademark Bill, see McCARTHY, supra note 63, § 22:4, at 29-35. 
66 Michigan is considered a common law dilution state as a result of the following 
cases that issued an injunction based on a dilution theory. However, all of these cases 
were coupled with confusion and trademark infringement. See 0 M Scott & Sons Co. 
v. Surowitz, 209 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mich 1962); Komer Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug 
Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697 (E.D.Mich. 1976); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Cen-
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case granting an injunction for dilution has been sustained on ap-
peal,67 and that occurred over ten years ago. In fact, in 1990, 
Washington's Legislature adopted a dilution statute that is almost 
identical to proposed section 43(c).68 However, in over three years 
since the effective date of the Washington statute, not one single 
reported case has even referenced the existence of the statute let 
alone used it to enjoin the conduct of a non-competing trademark 
user.69 
The actual current status of dilution in United States courts is 
merely a tacked-on cause of action added to most complaints for 
trademark infringement. Because only four of the thousands of 
such complaints containing dilution causes of action were success-
ful in sustaining a dilution claim in the federal circuit courts dur-
ing the last seventeen years,70 judges apparently either do not 
understand dilution or do not take dilution statutes seriously. Ap-
parently, courts do not see dilution claims as distinct from the un-
derlying trademark action. To say that an increasing number of 
courts are issuing injunctions on pure dilution grounds seems in-
stead to be an overly optimistic outlook for the future. 
However, dilution proponents have been recently encouraged 
by the Supreme Court's dicta that Congress "could determine that 
unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm 
the [plaintiff/trademark holder] by lessening the distinctiveness 
tral Transport, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 524 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Therefore, it is far from 
clear whether a plaintiff would succeed on a pure dilution common law cause of ac-
tion in Michigan. 
New Jersey has also recognized common law dilution. See Chanel, Inc. v. Casa 
Flora Co., 241 A.2d 24 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), cm. denied, 242 A.2d 381 (NJ. 
1968). But see Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A & P Trucking Corp., 149 A.2d 595 (NJ. 
1959) (injunction issued even though there was no competition, but court required 
and found a reasonable likelihood of confusion). See also Caesar's World, Inc. v. Cae-
sar's Palace, 490 F. Supp. 818 (D.NJ. 1980). Therefore, it is also quite unlikely that a 
plaintiff would prevail in New Jersey under the common law in a pure dilution cause 
of action. 
Ohio also appears to recognize a common law cause of action for dilution. See 
Ameritech, Inc. v. American INF Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 
1987). 
67 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377 (Or. 1983). 
68 WASH. REv. CoDE § 19.77.160 (1992). 
69 Search of LEXIS, Washington state cases library (Mar. 29, 1994). 
70 See supra note 45. 
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and thus the commercial value of the marks."71 In support of this 
proposition, the Supreme Court cited Schechter.72 Therefore, at 
least at this time, an attack on any federal dilution statute as uncon-
stitutional will probably not be well received by the Supreme Court 
unless it is grounded in the First Amendment. 
Today, most non-academic commentators in trademark law 
strongly support dilution statutes.73 Commentators such as Patti-
shall,74 McCarthy75 and Gilson 76 all strongly favor the proposed di-
lution statute.77 These commentators have done much to further 
the field and their efforts deserve credit. However, before a federal 
dilution cause of action is created, I urge a final reconsideration.78 
71 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 539 (1987). 
72 [d. 
73 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 3, at 108; Muller, supra note 4, at 175; Slenzak, supra 
note 4, at 205. 
74 Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rntionak for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 
Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 618 (1976) [hereinafter Pattishall, Dilution 
Rationak]; Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rntionak for Trade-
mark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REp. 289 (1984) [hereinafter Pattishall, 
Dawning Acceptance]; BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL & DAVlD C. HILLIARD, TRADEMARKS, 
TRADE IDENTITY, AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES §§ 5.1-5.3 (1974). 
75 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETmON § 24.13 (3d ed. 
1992). 
76 Gilson, supra note 3; JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE 
§ 5.05[2] (1993). 
77 See also 3 RUDOLPH CAi.LMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR CoMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, 
AND MONOPOUES 953-78 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter CAu.MANN]; 2 HARRy D. NIMS, THE 
LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETmON AND TRADEMARKS 1204-06 (4th ed. 1947); Rudolph 
Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?: The Importance of the Property Concept 
in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 443 (1947) [hereinafter Callmann,Unfair 
Competition Without Competition?]. 
78 Many other commentators also urge a final reconsideration before adopting a 
federal dilution cause of action. See, e.g., Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution 
Laws Compatibk With the National Protection of Trademarks ?, 75 TRADEMARK REp. 269, 273 
(1985) (noting that dilution protects the mark while confusion protects the business); 
Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rntional Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 
TRADEMARK REp. 122 (1993); George E. Middleton, Some Reflections on Dilution, 42 
TRADEMARK REp. 175 (1952); HowardJ. Shire, Dilution versus Deception-Are State An-
tidilution Laws and Appropriate Alternative to the Law of Infringement?, 77 TRADEMARK REp. 
273 (1987) (stating that the inadequate articulation of the damage to the senior 
trademark user or the benefit derived by the junior user makes dilution difficult to 
justify); David S. Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Probkm of State An-
tidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1992); Walter Derenberg, The Probkm of Trademark 
Protection and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L. REv. 439 (1956). But see Michael L. 
Taviss, In Search of a Consistent Trademark Dilution Test: Mead Data Central, Inc. v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1499, 1475 n.252 (1990) (stating 
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I do not share the feelings of these commentators that a fed-
eral dilution statute is imperative at this juncture. Because there 
are only four federal cases in seventeen years where a dilution 
cause of action has been sustained, the problem simply cannot be 
as immediate as the dilution proponents would have us believe. 
Furthermore, even within those four cases, the dilution cause of 
action was dubious at best. If, for example, COOKIE JAR is famous 
enough for ATMs,79 it is very difficult to conceive of a reason why 
LEXIS is not famous for computer assisted research services80 or 
why FRUIT OF THE LOOM is not famous for underwear.81 
IV. opposition to Proposed Section 43 (c) 
Given this background to the dilution discourse, there are 
many reasons why a federal dilution statute is unwise. The follow-
ing presents both practical, as well as theoretical reasons, why pro-
posed section 43 (c) should be opposed. 
A. Practical Problems with Proposed Section 43(c) 
1. Trademarks Are Not Really Subject to Dilution 
If proposed section 43(c) is enacted, it would become one of 
the few pieces of legislation in recent times where the old saying "a 
remedy without a wrong"82 really would apply. That is, the propo-
nents of dilution have not established that trademarks are even sus-
ceptible to dilution. No mark has ever actually, quantitatively been 
established to have been diluted.83 If it had, we should be able to 
point to a specific trademark that was worth Xbefore the entry ofa 
newcomer but worth X minus Yafter the entry of a non-competing 
that a federal dilution statute would promote unifonnity); Meadows, supra note 65, at 
426. 
79 See Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034 (11th Cir . 
. 1982). 
80 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 
1989) (holding that LEXIS mark used on data retrieval not famous enough for dilu-
tion analysis). See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
81 Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1993). 
82 See, e.g., Harriet K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, 
and Copyright: REmedies Without Wrongs, 65 Bos. U. L. REv. 923 (1985). 
83 In fact, in Ringling Bros., the court stated that dilution damages are unknowable 
and it is this fact that makes the damages irreparable even lacking any real evidence. 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, 
855 F.2d 480, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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and diluting newcomer. Because there is none leads me to doubt 
even the existence of the idea of dilution.84 
However, as articulated by Schechter, the problem actually 
does have some superficial appeal. If marks greatly lose their value 
simply through their usage by non-competitors, it seems that such 
conduct should be prevented to protect the goodwill of the mark 
holder. However, the very marks Schechter himself used as exam-
ples are either still very strong and distinctive trademarks or have 
appropriately ceased to exist as he knew them.85 These changes 
were due to natural economic factors and not dilution. Kodak is 
still used on cameras; Rolls-Royce is still used on automobiles. 
Somehow, the holders of these marks have been able to maintain 
and prevent others from using their marks in a manner that would 
lessen the distinctive value of their marks. Neither Kodak nor 
Rolls-Royce has ever been a party to a reported dilution cause of 
action in the sixty-five years since Schechter's article.86 Therefore, 
it seems that they were capable of protecting their marks from 
Schechter's feared dilution. There are no Kodak tires and there 
are no Rolls-Royce sunglasses undermining the value of these "fa-
mous" trademarks. 
An objective, longitudinal study is required to establish that 
trademarks are subject to dilution as defined. Until a specific harm 
can be identified, a consumer's "ephemeral state of mind," over 
which some dilution proponents purport to have a complete un-
derstanding,87 should not be sufficient justification alone to create 
84 The only real attempt that I can find to quantify actual dilution damage is Alex-
ander Simonson, How and l-Wzen Do Trademarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to Judge 
"Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REp. 149 (1993). Although this article's pur-
pose was apparently to provide tests for determining if dilution has occurred, the 
flaws in its analysis cuts against its persuasiveness. First, it claims that trademark dilu-
tion is a "psychological phenomenon." Id. That any court can evaluate psychological 
phenomenon using the tests proposed seems doubtful at best. More importantly, 
however, is that the author fundamentally misconstrues trademark protection. The 
author's understanding of dilution is that use of a similar mark on non-competing 
goods lessens the public'S ability to identify "product categories." Id. at 152-53. This 
is not the purpose of trademark protection. To the degree a mark comes to identify 
the product or product category and not the producer, the mark becomes generic. 
Therefore, this attempted quantification of dilution reads more like a way to monopo-
lize a generic trademark. Perhaps this is why courts have been so loath to adopt dilu-
tion rationale. 
85 See Schechter, supra note 8, at 829. 
86 Search of LEXIS, Mega library (Mar. 29, 1994). 
87 See, e.g., Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra note 74, at 625. 
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new and expansive trademark rights not recognized at common 
law. 
2. State Dilution Statutes Are Overbroad and Ignored by 
Courts 
As stated above,88 contrary to dilution proponents' claims, 
only about two percent of dilution cases brought to the federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal since 1977 have resulted in a sustained injunc-
tion based solely upon dilution. Therefore, the state dilution 
statutes have had virtually no impact on the outcome of trademark 
cases to date. 
Rather, courts are still quite hostile to the notion of dilution 
even in light of clear legislative mandates to the contrary. For ex-
ample, the New York dilution statute states that: 
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for 
injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or 
not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstand-
ing the absence of competition between the parties or the ab-
sence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.89 
Thus, in New York, the use of a mark may be enjoined regardless 
of whether there is confusion in the minds of the consumers, regard-
less of whether there is competition between the parties and regard-
less of whether the mark is registered. There is no mention in the 
statute that the plaintiff's mark has to be anything other than "a 
mark." There is no minimum threshold required for the strength of 
the plaintiff's mark. There is no clear indication that the statute ap-
plies only to famous trademarks. In fact, on its face, the New York 
dilution statute appears to apply to any trademark. 
In one of the more popular dilution cases to date, the plain lan-
guage of the New York dilution statute did not prevent the Second 
Circuit from requiring that confusion be demonstrated and that the 
plaintiff's mark be "famous" or even "very famous" before it would 
sustain an injunction for dilution. In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,90 the Second Circuit dissolved the district 
88 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
89 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1992). 
90 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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court's injunction91 based upon the New York dilution statute. The 
district court had enjoined Toyota from using the trademark LEXUS 
on automobiles, accepting Mead Data's argument that such use di-
luted the LEXIS trademark as used on computer-assisted data retrieval 
systems.92 
The first reason the Second Circuit gave for dissolving the injunc-
tion was because the marks LEXUS and LEXIS themselves were not 
confusingly similar.93 The court held that the "everyday spoken Eng-
lish" test used by the district court was the wrong test. Rather, the 
court held that the proper test to utilize was a trained radio or televi-
sion announcer-what I refer to as the "Dan Rather test"-to deter-
mine if the marks are confusingly similar.94 
There are, of course, many problems with this analysis. First, it is 
well settled in trademark law that one primary objective is to guard 
against the likelihood of consumer confusion. It is not confusion be-
tween the marks, but rather confusion in the minds of the consumers 
as to the source of the goods that is actionable. 
Apparently, in one broad stroke, the Second Circuit changed that 
standard. Although likelihood of dilution. in the minds of the con-
sumers is supposed to be the test, the Second Circuit required that 
someone other than the average consumer be used to determine if 
the marks are confusingly similar. Generally, the articulated purpose 
of dilution is to prevent the whittling away of the distinctive value of 
the mark in the minds of the consumer.95 However, to determine 
whether the marks are similar, the Second Circuit required that a 
non-consumer-a person with special capabilities in enunciating 
trademarks-be employed. If the marks are confusingly similar, 
either to Dan Rather or when one hears Dan Rather speak them (ap-
parently, regardless of the appearance or meaning of the marks), 
then, and only then, will the Second Circuit find dilution. This tor-
tured reasoning by the court should be understood as a rather crea-
tive attempt at avoiding the application of the dilution statute, for 
91 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp 1031 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
92 [d. at 1044. 
93 The court held that only "the marks must be 'very' or 'substantially' similar and 
that, absent such similarity, there can be no viable claim of dilution." Mead Data, 875 
F.2d at 1029. 
94 [d. at 1030. 
95 [d. at 1031 (emphasis added). 
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nowhere else in the common law of trademarks is confusion between 
the marks forgiven if Dan Rather is able to distinguish between them. 
Furthermore, requiring the Dan Rather Test for enunciation pre-
determines the outcome. If LEXUS and LEXIS are not confusingly 
similar in sound, meaning or appearance, then only an exactly identi-
cal mark may dilute. This is completely contrary to the law the Sec-
ond Circuit cited as controlling.96 It is also totally contrary to reality. 
One finds numerous indications in the mass media where journalists, 
who are also supposed to be "more careful and precise"97 in their use 
of the English language, have not been able to avoid confusing LEXIS 
with LEXUS.98 That is, even though the statute clearly states that an 
injunction may be issued "regardless of confusion," the Second Cir-
cuit denied the injunction partially on tortured reasoning that the 
marks are not confusingly similar. 
Furthermore, even though the New York dilution statute does not 
require fame, the Second Circuit dissolved the injunction, arguing 
that Mead Data's mark was not famous.99 The Second Circuit argued 
that LEXIS may have been strong and distinctive within Mead Data's 
market of attorneys and accountants, but with the public at large it 
had very little selling power. IOO Therefore, because the public at large 
was not aware of Mead Data's LEXIS trademark, the Second Circuit 
said the mark was not famous and, accordingly, dissolved the 
injunction.101 
This analysis also prejudges the outcome in a rather crafty man-
ner. In trademark infringement analysis, one element in determining 
infringement is for the court to consider the strength of the mark.l02 
96 See id. at 1030-31 (citing Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, 
Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977». 
97 Id. at 1030. 
98 See, e.g., Rich Hein, Law School Bringing Computer to Classroom, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Jan. 2, 1992, at 51 (where the author writes LEXUS when referring to the computer-
assisted data retrieval system rather than LEXIS). 
99 875 F.2d at 1031. Actually, in different places in the opinion, the Second Cir-
cuit requires that the mark be "distinctive," id. at 1030, then "famous," id. at 1031, 
then "very famous." Id. It appears that the Second Circuit's fame requirement in-
creased as it went along. 
wOld. 
101 Id. at 1031-32. Specifically, the court noted that only one percent of the general 
public associated LEXIS with Mead Data. Id. at 1028. 
102 Most circuits have adopted some form of a strength test in their multi-factored 
infringement analysis. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 
(2d Cir. 1961), em. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 
F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, 
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As with all infringement analyses, this analysis is actually an inquiry 
into the perception of the ordinary purchaser, not of consumers at 
large.103 The ordinary purchaser is the class of consumers that actu-
ally or prospectively buys the trademark holder's goods or services. 
Therefore, when the Second Circuit requires a mark to be "fa-
mous" in the minds of consumers at large before it will apply the dilu-
tion statute, the court actually predetermines the outcome of dilution 
cases. There are very few marks that are truly famous in the minds of 
consumers at large. Totally inconsistent with this requirement is the 
Second Circuit's refusal to apply the ordinary person test to deter-
mine whether the marks are similar. In other words, the Second Cir-
cuit required that a specially trained person be used to determine if 
LEXIS and LEXUS sound alike, but required the populace at large to 
be used to determine if the plaintiff's mark is famous. I can find no 
support whatsoever for this proposition in the common law. 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit stated in Mead Data that outside 
Mead Data's primary market of attorneys and accountants, the mark 
LEXIS "has very little selling power."104 Because LEXIS lacked this 
selling power outside of its primary market, the court held that LEXIS 
was not famous and therefore not capable of being diluted. Again, 
this analysis is completely contrary to the alleged purpose of dilution 
theory. That is, dilution is not supposed to protect the selling power 
outside of the primary mark's market, but rather to protect it from a 
whittling away of the distinctiveness of the mark in its own market. lO5 
Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Helene Curtis 
Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977), cen. denied, 434 
U.S. 1070 (1978); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. 
v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). Even the Restatement of Torts re-
quires a showing of strength. See REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938). For a conve-
nient review of each circuit's elements in infringement analysis, see DONALD S. 
CHISUM & MICHAEL A.JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLEcruAL PROPERlY LAw § 5F[1][a] 
(1992). 
103 See In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Omaha Nat'l 
Corp., 819 F.2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Although these cases address distinctive-
ness for registration purposes, the analysis is the same for categorizing marks for in-
fringement analysis as well. 
104 Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 103l. 
lO5 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30J.L. & ECON. 265,308-09 (1987). The law and economic attack on dilution 
states that dilution confusion does not occur in the primary market for the trade-
marked good, but rather in a new "resale" market where consumers compete to get 
the cheapest copy possible. Protecting a trademark from dilution is like granting 
trademark protection to a descriptive mark without secondary meaning. It all adds 
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Even dilution proponents, I think, would recognize the monopolistic 
aspects of attempting to protect or create "selling power" of a mark 
outside of its own market. 
By adding these judicially-crafted requirements that the mark be 
''very famous" and confusingly similar, even though the statute does 
not require them, it becomes obvious that the Second Circuit is ex-
tremely hostile to the concept of dilution. To say otherwise is rather 
misleading. If the mark LEXUS as used on automobiles does not di-
lute LEXIS as used on computerized data-retrieval systems, the doc-
trine of dilution adds nothing to the common law of unfair 
competition.106 On its face, the language of the New York dilution 
statute, as well as all other state dilution statutes, is clearly broad 
enough to allow for an injunction in Mead Data. The judicially-crafted 
contortions used to avoid an injunction based upon trademark dilu-
tion can only lead to the conclusion that at least the Second Circuit is 
not receptive to the dilution cause of action. 107 
Indeed, LEXUS has not been a "cancer-like growth"108 whittling 
away the distinctive quality of LEXIS. If anything, it has heightened 
people's awareness of the existence of Mead Data. Therefore, if 
LEXUS had diluted LEXIS, Toyota would be required to compensate 
Mead Data in corrective advertising costs and by refraining from using 
LEXUS.109 If dilution is a compensable event when one detracts or 
dilutes the distinctiveness of someone else's mark, should it not also 
then be a compensable event if one contributes to the distinctiveness 
of a mark? Therefore, if one carries the dilution rationale through to 
its logical end, it seems at least in Mead Data that Mead Data is being 
unjustly enriched by Toyota'S conduct. 
If a mark is capable of being diluted by the use of a similar, but 
transaction costs to the price of the goods or prevents other manufacturers from mak-
ing cheap copies. Id. 
106 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 1963). 
107 In response to losing in the Second Circuit, Mead Data's extrajudicial remedy is 
truly amazing. Subsequent to the Second Circuit's opinion, Mead Data began spon-
soring the Infinity Sweepstakes and broadcasting the winner to all on-line users of 
their services. Toyota'S response has been at least equally as creative. Toyota now 
sells access to a maintenance related computer data retrieval system in conjunction 
with the sale of its LEXUS automobiles. They call this service LEXUS SATELLITE 
NETWORK. 
108 See Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 
1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977). 
109 This was the remedy granted below. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor 
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031, lO44 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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not confusing mark on non-competing goods, then it should also be 
capable of being made more distinct by the conduct of a third party. If, 
as dilution proponents argue, the use of all trademarks impacts upon 
the value of others, then the antithesis to dilution also should not only 
be possible but should be equally compensable. Therefore, it appears 
that because LEXUS did not dilute LEXIS, Mead Data must owe 
Toyota for the increased value to its trademark, for if it did not dilute 
LEXIS then it must have made it more distinct. Dilution proponents 
do not allow for one mark to have no effect on another. Therefore, 
the third option-no effect-is not a possibility. 
3. Courts Apply Confusion Element Inconsistently 
Interestingly enough, dilution proponents argue that because 
courts have been inconsistent in their application of almost identi-
cal state dilution statutes, this somehow militates a federal solution 
to the problem to establish consistency.lIo However, if, as I argue, 
there is doubt that trademarks are subject to dilution at all (or, if 
diluted, whether that is always a negative event in the greater per-
spective), state inconsistency should be expected. When a right is 
vague and impossible to articulate, courts will always be inconsis-
tent in their application of that right. To legislate a mandatory 
outcome to an issue that is by no means settled does a disservice to 
our system of federalism. To me, the inconsistencies between the 
federal circuits and district courts in their application of dilution is 
only further evidence that the necessity of the remedy should be 
reconsidered. 
For example, New York courts require evidence of confusion 
even though the New York statute clearly dictates that dilution may 
be found regardless of confusion. III Oddly enough, the Illinois 
courts will refuse to find dilution if there is confusion.112 There-
fore, New York courts require confusion while Illinois courts pre-
clude dilution remedies when there is confusion. To make matters 
worse, the New York dilution statute and the Illinois dilution stat-
110 Muller, supra note 4, at 187 ("Inconsistent and improper detenninations of dis-
tinctiveness are significant arguments for simply scrapping all state antidilution laws 
and starting over with a more precise federal statute."). Perhaps if the federal statute 
were precise or if the concept were capable of being described precisely, I would be 
less opposed to it. 
III Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra note 74, at 624 n.47. 
112 See generally James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 
(7th Cir. 1976). 
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ute are identical. 113 
Such a gross inconsistency in the application of identical stat-
utes is only problematic if the underlying right at stake is well-rec-
ognized and historically received. However, in our common law 
system, if the legitimacy of the underlying right at stake is question-
able, such inconsistencies indicate that courts are not receptive to 
the concept of dilution. To think that courts will amend their 
views of dilution because of the existence of a federal statute, 
rather than the current twenty-five state statutes and three com-
mon law jurisdictions that they were supposed to be interpreting, 
seems very naIve. 
Although legal realism 114 may have been dealt a final death 
blow in the politically correct rhetoric of our society when even 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in her confirmation hearings that 
judges do not make law, they interpret and apply the law,115 such 
games with semantics should not be accepted blindly. Courts have 
been extremely active in making law when it comes to applying 
dilution statutes. The purpose of virtually all of this law creation 
has been to avoid applying the clear mandates of the various stat-
utes. Therefore, it does not seem realistic that courts would drasti-
cally alter their course and apply dilution any more often than they 
do currently. In fact, the proposed section 43(c) basically codifies 
the fame requirement that courts have grafted onto the state dilu-
tion statutes. Even the Model State Trademark Bill was amended 
to indicate this changey6 This all originated with the courts' un-
willingness to apply dilution statutes in monopolistic ways. 
4. Courts Blur the Distinction Between Confusion and 
Dilution 
The purpose of dilution is to plug a gap in trademark protec-
113 Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986) with N.Y. GEN. Bus. 
lAw § 368-d (McKinney 1992). 
114 Legal realism is, of course, the notion that judges do make law to justify the 
outcomes of the cases they adjudicate. That is, first judges decide the outcome and 
then they find, apply and make fit the law that justifies that result. See generally KARL 
N. LLWEELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (2d ed. 1951); THEODORE M. BENDITf, lAw AS 
RULE AND PRINCIPLE (1978). 
115 Transcript of Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: Confirmation of Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice, Federal News Service,july 21, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew file. 
116 See USTA Report, supra note 16, at 459. 
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tion.117 That is, a dilution cause of action is supposed to be a rem-
edy distinct from trademark infringement. Such distinction makes 
practical sense; however, as applied, it becomes nonsense. Courts 
have had a very difficult time severing dilution analysis from trade-
mark infringement analysis. The attempts in the form of proposed 
section 43(c) will only lead to greater uncertainty and strange ap-
plications of the law. 
It appears from the language of proposed section 43(c) that 
the drafters were primarily concerned with defining which marks 
would be famous enough to be used offensively in a dilution cause 
of action. Rather than providing any language whatsoever about 
when a mark dilutes another, much language is provided to help 
courts define what a famous or distinctive mark is and to clarify 
that only these famous or distinctive marks will be statutorily recog-
nized as capable of being diluted. Apparently, if the mark is 
deemed famous, dilution is a foregone conclusion. lIB 
For example, the factors in determining a likelihood of confu-
sion and the factors in determining a likelihood of dilution are 
indistinguishable. 119 
DILUTION FACTORS120 INFRINGEMENT FACTORS121 
Renown of senior mark 
Similarity of marks 
Similarity of products 
Predatory intent 
Renown of junior mark 
Sophistication of buyers 
117 Derenberg, supra note 78, at 441. 
Strength of the mark 
Similarity of marks 
Similarity of products 
Defendant's intent 
Quality of defendant's product 
Sophistication of buyers 
Will gap be bridged? 
Actual confusion 
lIB Only Judge Sweet in his concurrence in Mead Data has seriously addressed a 
real test for dilution. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 
875 F.2d 1026,1035-38 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet,]., concurring). 
119 The following is a comparison of the likelihood of dilution factors and likeli-
hood of infringement factors as determined by the Second Circuit. Although the test 
in each circuit differs slightly, the same comparisons would be valid. 
120 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota 'Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 
1035-38 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring) (noting that the proposed test for 
dilution should mirror infringement analysis). See also Welkowitz, supra note 9, at 572-
73 (criticizing Judge Sweet's test as operating as little more than a less rigorous 
confusion test). 
121 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cm. 
denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). These are also known. as the "Polaroid factors." 
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As can be clearly seen, all of the six likelihood of dilution factors 
proposed by Judge Sweet have an identical likelihood of infringement 
corresponding factor. If Judge Sweet's approach in Mead Data is fol-
lowed, having completely parallel tests will not enhance the alleged 
distinctive nature of a dilution cause of action. In fact, it will likely 
cause even more confusion in the minds of judges that must apply 
these tests. Because of this conceptual similarity between the two 
causes of action, judges tend to blur this distinction. It is hard to un-
derstand how proposed section 43(c) would be able to clarify this 
situation. 
The same is true regarding the "fame factors" as stated in the 
proposed section 43(c). In this case, each of these factors correspond 
to an inquiry into secondary meaning. The fame factors from pro-
posed section 43(c) include: (1) the extent of the mark's inherent or 
acquired distinctiveness; (2) the duration and breadth of the mark's 
use in relation to the goods and services; (3) the duration and scope 
of the mark's advertising and publicity; (4) the geographical scope of 
the trading area where the mark is actually used; (5) the channels of 
trade; (6) the degree of the mark's recognition in its and the other 
party's trading areas and channels of trade; and (7) the nature and 
scope of the use of the same or similar marks by others.122 
Although the intent of the ITA in drafting these fame factors was 
to clarify which trademarks would be famous or distinctive enough to 
warrant dilution protection,123 implementation of these factors as 
drafted will actually have the opposite effect upon courts. Because 
these fame factors so closely resemble those used to determine 
whether a trademark is either distinctive or has secondary meaning, 
more courts rather than less are likely to be confused in applying 
these factors. 
For example, the first factor, the degree of inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness, highlights the problem. Although a distinct remedy, 
trademark discourse and terminology played a major role in the draft-
ers' attempts to define and describe the harm they perceive. How-
ever, the first factor instructs that to determine if a mark is famous, it 
should be inherently distinctive or have acquired distinctiveness.124 
122 See USTA Report, supra note 16, at 458-59. 
123 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 116. 
124 See generaUy McCARTHY, supra note 63, § 11.1, at 433. Trademarks are catego-
rized from inherently distinctive to weak. The strongest marks are arbitrary or fanci-
ful marks, that is, made up names with no product association in the minds of the 
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The problem is that the drafters have used trademark terminol-
ogy to attempt to capture dilution rhetoric. When speaking of distinc-
tiveness for dilution purposes, it is clear that courts require far more 
for a mark allegedly diluted than they do for a mark that is allegedly 
infringed. Therefore, it should be no surprise if courts continue to 
confuse and blur dilution analysis with infringement analysis. 
Although they are intended to be mutually exclusive inquiries-to fill 
the gap in trademark protection-they use the exact same 
terminology. 
However, the fact is that distinctiveness for trademark analysis is 
not synonymous with distinctiveness for dilution analysis. A distinctive 
trademark does not necessarily equal a distinctive or famous mark for 
dilution analysis. 125 One could have a distinctive and strong mark for 
purposes of trademark infringement or validity, but that same mark 
would not be sufficiently distinctive to support an injunction for 
dilution. 126 
The use of the term "distinctive" in both trademark analysis and 
dilution analysis standing for two totally different concepts will cause 
even more confusion within the minds of courts and litigants. Use of 
the term "fame" helps clarify the distinction, but it is hindered if fame 
is defined by use of the term "distinctive." Because "distinctive" has a 
well litigated meaning within trademark jurisprudence, it should be 
left out of the fame factors. 
Furthermore, the fame factors blur the concept of secondary 
meaning into the determination of fame. 127 All of the fame factors 
consumers. Suggestive marks are second on the continuum. Suggestive marks are 
those that require some imagination for the purchaser to associate the mark with the 
product on which it is used. Descriptive marks are those that only describe the goods 
or an attribute of the goods. Descriptive marks are not valid unless they possess sec-
ondary meaning. Finally, generic marks are those that, in the minds of the relevant 
purchasing public, signify the product and not the producer. [d. 
125 Apparently the defendant in Ringling Bros. made the same argument. The court 
called it "unique" and dismissed it completely. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, 855 F.2d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 1988). 
126 See, e.g., Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1275 (N.D.N.Y. 
1990). Also, a mark that was initially weak, but has through the holder's use become 
strong and distinctive, will most likely not be famous for dilution analysis where it 
would be considered strong and distinctive for trademark infringement analysis. See, 
e.g., Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(plaintiff transferred symbol of lion, an inherently weak mark, into a strong one but 
still only able to obtain injunction that resembled plaintiff's use of a lion on 
advertising) . 
127 "Trademark protection for descriptive marks is extended only in recognition of 
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could also be used as a factor to determine if a descriptive mark has 
secondary meaning. 
Generally, the analysis of secondary meaning includes analyzing 
the following factors: (1) the amount and manner of advertising; (2) 
the volume of sales; and (3) the duration and manner of use.128 If a 
trademark holder has spent significant amounts of money advertis-
ing,129 has a sufficient amount of sales and has used the mark for 
more than a year or two,130 even a rather descriptive mark may pass 
for being valid and having secondary meaning if the trademark 
holder's use has been efIective.131 More specifically, secondary mean-
ing is determined not only by looking at the use of the mark by the 
holder, but also by determining what impact such use has had in the 
minds of the consumer.132 This is typically shown by survey evidence 
that establishes that when a consumer is confronted with a specific 
trademark, the consumer identifies it as representing a single 
source-even though that source may be anonymous-of the good 
and not the good itself.133 
To determine if a mark is famous, the drafters of proposed sec-
tion 43(c) use essentially the same terminology that is used when ana-
lyzing whether any particular mark has secondary meaning and is 
therefore valid. Again, this blurs the distinction between trademark 
analysis and dilution analysis. Such blurring will cause great confu-
sion in the minds of those attempting to apply the dilution statute and 
will, ultimately, detract from a consistent, common sense application 
of the statute. 
If there is going to be a federally recognized dilution statute dis-
tinct from the trademark cause of action, the same terminology to 
define and characterize trademark rights should not be used to define 
consumer acceptance and recognition of such marks as denoting only one seller or 
source." McCARTHY, supra note 63, § 11.9, at 453-54. See also id. at 455-56 (defining 
secondary meaning). 
128 See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
129 McCARTHY, supra note 63, § 11.5, at 445. 
130 [d. § 11.9, at 454-55. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. § 11.1, at 434. 
133 See Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc. 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (stating 
that to establish that a mark has secondary meaning, the holder must show that in the 
minds of the public the mark signifies a source). See also Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 118 (1938); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 
(6th Cir. 1912). 
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and characterize alleged dilution rights. Doing so blurs the distinc-
tion and again facilitates the argument that the dilution statute is 
practically unnecessary. Even if the same language is not used, differ-
ent language used only to mask a redundant inquiry will hinder appli-
cation of any dilution statute. 
As envisioned and articulated by the founders of dilution theory, 
dilution and infringement should be mutually exclusive. Recovery for 
infringement should preclude recovery for dilution and recovery for 
dilution should preclude recovery for infringement. However, courts 
have not interpreted state statutes in this manner and the drafters of 
proposed section 43(c) have substantially contributed to the problem 
by choosing terminology that has an established meaning in trade-
mark jurisprudence, but a different meaning for dilution analysis. 
5. Proposed Section 43(c) Would Create New Trademark 
Rights and Therefore Violate the Lanham Act's 
Stated Objective 
The express legislative intent of the Lanham Act was to codify 
existing common law.134 The legislative history to the Act clearly 
indicates that its purpose is not to create new rights but rather to 
codify existing common law rights.135 Its objective was to create 
essentially a registration statute. Therefore, to the extent Congress 
grants new rights in the Lanham Act, they exceed their own ex-
pressed purpose.136 
A federal dilution statute would have the same effect. Cur-
rently, twenty-five states have enacted dilution statutes.137 Addi-
tionally, courts in three states, Ohio,138 New Jersey139 and 
Michigan,140 have expressly adopted a common law dilution cause 
of action. Therefore, twenty-two states have not adopted any form 
of dilution. Indeed, the Nevada Legislature intentionally omitted 
134 92 CONGo REc. 7524 (1946). 
135 See Port, supra note 28, at 542-43. 
136 [d. 
137 See supra note 65. 
138 See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 
1981). 
139 See, e.g., Chane), Inc. v. Casa Flora Co, 241 A.2d 24 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1967), cert. denied, 242 A.2d 381 (NJ. 1968); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A & P Truck-
ing Corp., 149 A.2d 595 (NJ. 1959). 
140 See 0 M Scott & Sons Co. v. Surowitz, 209 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mich. 1962). 
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the dilution section of the Model Act from its trademark statute.141 
If Congress passes proposed section 43(c) into law, new rights will 
be granted in twenty-two states for trademark holders. These new 
rights will not be recognized by the common law or the statutory 
law of that state. For trademark holders in those states, proposed 
section 43(c) would clearly grant new rights and violate Congress' 
own statement of legislative purpose behind the Lanham Act. 
Because states such as Nevada142 and Arizona143 have affirma-
tively negated a cause of action for dilution, at least in those states, 
a federal cause of action would not only exceed the scope of state 
common law, but actually be contrary to it. 
State law must yield in light of a contradictory federal stat-
ute. 144 There are generally three types of preemption. The first is 
where Congress preempts state law by express language in a federal 
statute. For example, § 301 of the Copyright Act prevents states 
from granting protection in the nature of copyrights and preserves 
the field for federal regulation. 145 The second type of preemption 
occurs when federal statutory schemes are so pervasive that they 
"occup[y] the field" with no room left over for state regulation in 
the area. 146 The third way state law can be preempted is when the 
state regulations actually stand as a hinderance to the furthering of 
some larger federal objective.147 
Therefore, if Congress enacts proposed section 43(c), few 
could persuasively argue that it does not have the preemptive 
power based on the United States Constitution to supersede even 
contrary state laws. In fact, one court has already found a state 
dilution statute to be preempted by the Lanham Act. In United 
States Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc.,148 the court held that the 
Iowa dilution statute was preempted because it stood in the way of 
141 See STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw NV-5 (Miles J. Alexander et 
al. eds., 1990). 
142 See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 600.350 (Michie 1991). 
143 Arizona courts have also negated a dilution cause of action. See Uninger v. De-
sert Lodge, 160 P.2d 761 (Ariz. 1945). 
144 U.S. CONST. art VI. 
145 17 U.S.C § 301(a) (1988); Welkowitz, supra note 78, at 8. 
146 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983); Welkowitz, supra note 78, at 8. 
147 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989); WeI kowitz, supra note 78, 
at 8. 
148 661 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Iowa 1987). 
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nationwide, standardized trademark protection that was the objec-
tive of the Lanham Act. The court found that to the extent Iowa's 
statute provided additional protection not found in the Lanham 
Act, the statute was preempted.149 This argument has been sup-
ported by Milton Handler and others. 150 
However, to adopt proposed section 43(c) in an intellectually 
honest manner, Congress must come to grips with the legislative 
purpose of the Lanham Act, which was to codify common law and 
not create new rights. Given the fact that Congress would be ex-
pressly overriding the law of at least two states and creating new law 
in twenty others, this seems internally inconsistent and 
impracticable. 
For example, if trademark infringement had not been a cause 
of action in at least half of the states in 1946 when the Lanham Act 
was enacted, Congress would have been creating a substantial new 
right in those states and making actionable an act that the state 
legislatures had failed to prohibit or expressly permit. This is pre-
cisely what proposed section 43(c) will do. Preemption is accepta-
ble when there is a clear national consensus and an overriding 
congressional purpose. However, when the congressional purpose 
is to only codify common law, and not create new rights, but still 
have a national system of trademark protection, it would be quite 
an unnatural extension of trademark law to blindly preempt state 
law in this fashion. 
B. Theoretical Concerns 
1. Trademark Protection Is Justified by Tort, Not Trespass 
One of the life-long proponents of dilution is Beverly Patti-
shall. Pattishall has argued in multiple settings that the law of tres-
149 Welkowitz, supra note 78, at 8. 
150 See Handler, supra note 78, at 269. In addition, several people have commented 
that the Lanham Act should be read as federalizing the law of unfair competition, 
preserving it totally for Congress, like patents and copyrights have been preempted by 
federal statute. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What 
Slwuld Be the Read of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act7, 31 UCLA L. REv. 671, 679-81 
(1984); Charles Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987, 
998-1001 (1949); Paul Heald, Unfair Competition and Federal Law: Constitutional RPr 
straints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1411, 1432-40 (1987); Julias R. 
LunsfordJr., Trade-Marir.s and Unfair Competition-The Demise of Erie v. Tompkins?, 40 
TRADEMARK REp. 169,178-83 (1950). Clearly, this does not reflect the current state of 
the law. Welkowitz, supra note 78, at 11 n.47. 
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pass justifies the protection of trademarks. 151 To Pattishall, 
trespass is related to the intangible property right in the trademark 
itself. As I have argued elsewhere,152 for this to be true, the trade-
mark must actually be "owned." Because a trademark is incapable 
of being "owned," there can be no trespass to an illicit user of a 
mark, just as an individual cannot sue someone for trespassing on 
Blackacre if he or she does not own or is not in possession of 
Blackacre.153 
In 1952, George Middleton actually provided one of the best-
reasoned criticisms of dilution.154 Middleton's theory was that 
granting statutory rights to a trademark holder to enjoin a third 
party's dilution of the mark essentially creates a copyright in the 
trademark. 155 Middleton must have inherently understood the 
radical nature of Pattishall's claim, for to grant dilution rights to a 
trademark holder is the same as giving the trademark holder a mo-
nopoly on the mark as used in any context. Middleton expressed 
this in terms of copyright law-the first to use the mark on any 
good or service can enjoin any others regardless of the nature of 
defendant's use.156 This, in fact, does sound more like a copyright 
cause of action, rather than a trademark claim. 157 
Pattishall's response to this position is that dilution should 
151 Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance, supra note 74, at 289; Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, 
supra note 74, at 618. 
152 See Port, supra note 28, at 562. 
153 See, e.g., Whitehall Const. Co., Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 
165 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.C. 1958); Kuchenig v. California Co., 233 F. Supp. 389, 391 
(E.D. La. 1964); Peterson v. Conlan, 119 N.W. 367, 369-70 (N.D. 1909). 
154 Middleton, supra note 78, at 175. 
155 Id. at 178-79. 
156 Id. at 180. Middleton explained: 
Id. 
An original, ingenious trade-mark, protected because of those qualities, is 
a hybrid creature, part trade-mark, part copyright. It is more than a trade-
mark because a trade-mark need be neither original nor ingenious; it is 
less than a copyright because its life-span is not fixed by statute, but is 
determined by the exigencies of trade. It may endure for more than fifty-
six years but, on the other hand, it will surely cease upon the midnight 
with no pain on the demise of the trade it had symbolized. For not even 
the most ardent Schechterian would contend, I suppose, that a trade-
mark, however ingeniously contrived, survives the extinction of the trade 
that bore it. And does this not point up the underlying fallacy of the 
whole dilution rationale-the irrationality of the "rationale?" 
157 Copyright protection is available for original works fixed in a tangible form of 
expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1993). 
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only apply to fanciful or coined terms that did not exist in the Eng-
lish language prior to their use as a trademark.158 However, 
sources of the English language are very broad. Words like aspi-
rin,159 cellophane,l60 or shredded wheat, etc:161 did not exist prior 
to their use as trademarks. Certainly, Pattishall would not argue 
that someone, presumably a judge, should sit and decide the ety-
mology of every trademark and that decision should govern the 
outcome of the dilution cause of action. 
Pattishall has further argued that those who are opposed to 
dilution simply are misunderstanding the concept. 162 Pattishall has 
opined, "[p] erhaps the peculiar holdings of some courts stem from 
a lack of familiarity with the rather ephemeral 'state of mind' na-
ture of both the likelihood of confusion and dilution concepts. "163 
Although Pattishall has done much for the area of trademarks, 
he misstates the conceptual background of trademarks in our com-
mon law system of justice. His urging to make trademarks subject 
to property ownership have not been totally ineffective;l64 however, 
Pattishall's position is contrary to the common law course that 
trademarks have traversed over the past 200 years both in this 
country and in our common law ancestor, England. 
There is documented evidence that the concept of trademark 
has been used for over 3500 years to identify the source of a pio-
ducer's goodS.165 However, judicial acceptance of the affirmative 
, 
-158 Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra note 74, at 625. 
159 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that the 
term "aspirin," once a trademark, had become the generic term for salicylic acid). 
160 Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1936) 
(holding that the mark "cellophane," once a trademark for plastic wrap, had become 
generic). 
161 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,116 (1938) (holding that the 
term "shredded wheat" had become generic). See also Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. 
Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 379 n.4 (Or. 1982) (noting that other examples of terms that 
have become generic include: yo-yo, jujubes and thermos). 
162 Pattishall, Dilution Rationale, supra note 74, at 625. 
163 [d. 
164 See, e.g., Wyman Nelson Enters. v. Steak-n-Shake, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 976, 977 (D. 
Minn. 1971) (citing Beverly Pattishall, Trademams and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. 
REv. 967, 985-86 (1952». 
165 See generally Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademams, 45 TRADEMARK REp. 127 
(1955); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademams-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REp. 551 
(1969); Abraham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of TradtrMarks, 33 l.P.O.S. 876 
(1951); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning TradtrMarks, 9 MICH. L. 
REv. 29 (1910); EDWARD S. ROGERS, GoOD ,WILL, TRADE-MARKs AND UNFAIR TRADING 
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right of trademark started sometime before 1618 in England, when 
a cause of action was found against a cloth maker when he copied 
the plaintiff's mark and placed it on his substandard goods.l66 
Trademark law developed from unfair competition; unfair 
competition developed from the tort of fraud and deceit. 167 Eng-
lish courts first used the term unfair competition in 1803, using the 
words "passing off" or "palming off."I68 The justification of this 
tort was that one should not pass off one's goods as those of an-
other and thereby profit from the deception.169 
The confusion regarding whether trademark sounds in tort or 
in trespass stems from the old English rule in equity that an injunc-
tion would not issue unless a property right was at stake.170 How-
ever, in 1838, the court in Millington v. FoxI 71 granted an injunction 
in equity for trademark infringement and held that proof of de-
fendant's intent to defraud and knowledge of plaintiff's rights in 
and to the mark were not necessary for the plaintiff to prevail. 
Based upon this case, many, including Pattishall172 and 
Callmann,173 have come to the erroneous conclusion that a trade-
mark was subject to property ownership and that infringement con-
34,34-39 (1919); WILUAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TRADE-MARKs 1-
14 (rev. 2d ed. 1885). Browne traces the use of proprietary marks and trademarks 
back several millennia to China, India, Persia, Egypt, Rome and Greece, among other 
cultures, as well as citing marks used during the time of the Old Testament. [d. at 8-
10 (noting that the blocks of stone used to build the temple of Solomon bore quarry 
marks so the "mechanics" could "prov[e] their claims to wages" and that Abraham 
paid for the cave in which he buried Sarah with coins bearing a mark of authentica-
tion). "Seals and other emblems of ownership were coeval with the birth of traffic." 
[d. at 2. "Such emblems had their origin in a general ignorance of reading the combi-
nations of cabalistic characters that we call writing." [d. at 3. He discusses proprietary 
marks such as seals, sign-boards, watermarks, quarry and pottery marks, currency, 
identifying marks on merchandise in general and books. Id. at 3-14. See also GILSON, 
supra note 76, § 1.01[1]. 
166 Southern v. How, Popham 144,79 Eng. Rep. 1243, 1244, Trinity Term 15,jac 1 
(1618). I say "sometime prior to 1618" because the reference to the successful use of 
trademark is referred to in Southern v. How of that year, but the reference is actually to 
a prior, unreported or lost case. 
167 McCARTHY, supra note 75, § 5.02, at 5-4. 
168 Hogg v. Kirby, 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (1803). 
169 McCARTHY, supra note 75, § 5.02, at 5-3, 5-4. 
170 See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAw RELATING TO 
TRADEMARKS 150-52 (1925). 
171 3 My!. & Cr. 338, 352 (1838). 
172 Pattishall, Dauming Acceptance, supra note 74, at 309. 
173 CAiLMANN, supra note 77, § 21.12. 
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stituted a trespass, not a tort. 174 
Not only has the ancient notion that specific legal rules can be 
deduced from general principles been largely discredited and dis-
carded,175 but the momentary fixation that American courts had 
on claiming trademark as property has also rightfully passed. To-
day, when courts refer to trademarks as property, they are referring 
to the limited right of exclusion that constitutes the trademark 
right. Undoubtedly, this right of exclusion is a property right be-
cause it exhibits all normal incidents of ownership. 176 However, no 
courts have recognized property rights to the mark itself.I77 
Rather, the United States Supreme Court has stated as follows: 
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law 
tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers 
from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in 
the creation of "quasi-property rights" in communicative sym-
bols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the pro-
tection of producers as an incentive to product innovation. 178 
Thus, trademark protection is justified as a tort intended to prevent 
the consumer from being deceived, not a trespass on the trademark 
itself. 
In fact, the quotation above is not a novel nor unique expression 
of the common law of trademarks. The Supreme Court has continu-
174 Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal 
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REp. 305, 313 (1979). Given this, the more interesting ques-
tion is why do commentators of the stature of Pattishall or Callmann take this posi-
tion? It appears that the pro-property people are attempting, in good faith, to 
advance the status of trademark jurisprudence. It is unfortunate in our system that if 
one does not have a property interest in the matter at issue, it is somehow less signifi-
cant than if one does. In the unavoidable line-drawing that must go on in the law, 
property status of a trademark would definitely give a mark a greater standing in our 
system. However, if this is going to be the choice made, it ought to be a well-reasoned 
and thoroughly discussed issue, not a superficial attempt at protecting Kodak and 
Rolls-Royce-two trademarks that need the least help of any. 
175 [d. at 342. 
176 A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, at 8-9 (A.G. Guest 
ed., 1961); Port supra note 28, at notes 192-95 and accompanying text. 
177 However, this fact has not deterred Rudolph Callmann from claiming that the 
Lanham Act "gives this property right a legislative standing it had not had before by 
declaring trademarks incontestable .... This development should effectively put to 
rest all arguments advanced by opponents of the property right theory." Callmann, 
Unfair Competition Without Competition?, supra note 77, at 467. 
178 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (hold-
ing that federal patent act preempts all state patent laws). 
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ously held that the trademark right is "not in gross"179 and not a copy-
right or a patent, but that any rights to trademarks are appurtenant to 
the related business. The purpose is to exclude others from confusing 
usages, not to grant a monopoly in the mark in gross. 
A federal dilution statute would distort these common law tort 
origins of trademark beyond recognition. Because dilution expands 
the scope of protection of a trademark beyond the parameters set by 
the holders' actual use, dilution theory treats the trademark as if the 
mark itself were subject to single party property ownership. A federal 
dilution statute would adopt Pattishall's notion that trademarks sound 
in trespass, not in tort. If Congress is prepared to adopt Pattishall's 
theory, they must be willing to practically extend monopoly rights of 
specific words to an individual even though that individual has no in-
tention of using those terms on "the alleged diluter's goods. This is 
nothing more than granting the trademark holder the "negative and 
merely prohibitive use of [the mark] as a monopoly,"180 which the 
Supreme Court has clearly and continuously prohibited. 
Even this radical, pro-property perspective of trademarks does 
not conceptually ease the application of dilution doctrine on the fed-
erallevel. Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, the notion that 
trademark holders "own" the underlying mark itself and that acts that 
may be interpreted as diluting that mark constitute a trespass upon a 
property right of the trademark holder, proposed section 43(c) is not 
easily applied on a national basis. As stated above, only twenty-eight 
states recognize any form of trademark dilution.181 If the dilution of a 
mark constitutes a trespass on the property right of trademark "own-
ers" in those jurisdictions with dilution statutes, then in the states with-
out a dilution statute, it must be a property right for third parties to 
use a mark in any manner that does not infringe upon the established 
prior rights of another trademark owner. In fact, the Supreme Court 
seems to have at least analogously accepted the use of intellectual 
property as a property right itself when specifically conferred upon 
individuals by state law. 182 
179 Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 360 (1924); United Drug Co. v. Theo-
dore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 
U.S. 403, 413-15 (1916). 
180 See Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 360. 
181 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945); 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1983). 
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Therefore, in states where dilution has been determined by state 
common law or by legislative history to not be actionable, it must anal-
ogously constitute a protectable property right for a third party to use 
its mark in a manner that may dilute another's mark provided that 
such use does not actually infringe upon that prior user's mark. For 
example, in Nevada, dilution is not actionable. If party A uses Kodak 
on automobile tires, it would not be actionable dilution in that juris-
diction. Party A might use Kodak on tires for many years establishing 
some value and recognition to it as the source of Kodak tires. If pro-
posed section 43 (c) is implemented and the use of a trademark consti-
tutes property, then the enactment of the federal dilution statute 
should constitute a taking183 for which the "owner" of Kodak for use 
on tires in Nevada deserves just compensation from the government. 
The United States Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
CO.,I84 held that intellectual property in the form of trade secrets 
could be subject to unconstitutional takings based on the Fifth 
Amendment, like more tangible forms of property. 185 The Court also 
held that the term "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause in-
cludes the right to "use" a physical thing.I86 Although the takings 
analysis is an ad hoc, factual inquiry,I87 three basic elements are re-
viewed when determining if a compensable taking has occurred. I88 
These elements include analyzing the character of the governmental 
action, the economic impact of the regulation and the interference 
the regulation has with reasonable investment-backed expectations. I89 
183 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
184 467 U.S. 986 (1983). See also David G. Oberdick, The Taking of Trade Secrets: 
What Constitutes Just Compensation?, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 247 (1986). But see Pamela 
Samuelson, InfQT71lation as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365, 395 (1989) (noting that 
the modem rule holds that trade secrets are not property). 
185 467 U.S. at 1003 (stating that the Court has found various forms of intangible 
interests to be property for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause). 
186 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,377-78 (1945). 
187 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that "this Court, quite simply, has 
been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 1ustice and fairness' 
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment .... "). 
188 See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
189 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005; PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 
83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; Penn Centra~ 438 U.S. at 124. 
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The first aspect of this inquiry would be to detennine if proposed 
section 43(c) would constitute a "public use" that substantially ad-
vanced legitimate state interests. 190 Because a federal dilution statute 
would confer additional rights on individual trademark "owners" and 
not on the public itself, this element, at least at first blush, seems diffi-
cult to satisfy.191 However, the definition of "public use" is defined so 
expansively that if the use is beneficial or advantageous to the public it 
would still constitute a "public use."192 Because the purpose of the 
Lanham Act is to provide a national system of trademark registration, 
which is justified only if it, in fact, does benefit the public in some 
manner, this element of the takings analysis could easily be 
satisfied. 193 
The remaining analysis really addresses whether the regulation 
"goes 'too far' in its economic impact upon the party challenging 
it."194 In this hypothetical, if proposed section 43(c) were enacted, 
Party A would not only be out of business in the near future, but all of 
its investments based upon a reliance on state law would also be de-
stroyed. Therefore, the economic impact upon Party A would be ex-
treme. Such a regulation would clearly "totally eliminate[] the 
property's economic value or 'viability' to its nominal owner."195 
Therefore, as in Ruckelshaus,196 the focus in the above hypotheti-
cal should be directed to the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
190 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Nol-
Ian v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,831-32 (1987); Penn Centra~ 438 U.S. 
at 127. 
191 See, e.g., Daniel A Saunders, Copyright Law's Broken Rear Window: An Appraisal of 
Damage and Estimate of Repair, 80 CAL. L. REv. 179,227 (1992) (regarding analysis of 
proposed amendment to the Copyright Act defining colorization of film to be deriva-
tive works owned by the original copyright holder). But see Craig A Wagner, Motion 
Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628, 722-
24 (1989) (stating that amending the Copyright Act to provide original copyright 
holders with the ability to control the colorization of films would not violate the Tak-
ings Clause). 
192 Saunders, supra note 191, at 227 n.278. 
193 But see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 96 
(1986) ("The principal exceptions [to eminent domain] may be intellectual property 
rights such as patents and copyrights. But even here devices-for example, compul-
sory licensing decrees, themselves a kind of liability rule-may obviate the need for 
eminent domain."). 
194 Lawrence A Beyer, Intentionalism, Arl, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film 
Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1011,1076 (1988). See 
also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1933). 
195 Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987,88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1622 (1988). 
196 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1983). 
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tions of the trademark user in Nevada. Because there is express 
legislative history in Nevada that indicates the Legislature purposely 
omitted the dilution cause of action,197 it would be reasonable for 
someone to rely on the non-actionability of certain conduct and invest 
in the use of a trademark in a non-confusing manner. 
Subsequently, if Congress acts contrary to its own legislative inten-
tions by creating new trademark rights,198 the economic impact of an 
injunction against party A (user of Kodak on tires in Nevada) would 
be devastating. Due to the interference with the user's very reason-
able expectation that he would be left alone, it appears that a compen-
sable taking would have occurred.199 Because proposed section 43 (c) 
would create at least potential concerns regarding the Takings Clause, 
even the radical pro-property perspective advocated, either explicitly 
or implicitly, by the dilution proponents would not be easily imple-
mented on a national scale. 
2. Trademark Dilution Is Supported by Out-Dated Natural 
Rights Concepts 
The out-dated concept of natural rights does seem to support 
the dilution proponents' expansive objective of a federal dilution 
statute. It appears that the proponents of dilution theory, either 
explicitly or implicitly, accept the natural law theory of copyrights 
as described by Alfred C. Yen200 and apply it to trademarks to jus-
197 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
198 By granting new dilution rights to trademark holders, Congress would create 
rights not recognized at the common law. However, the purpose of the Lanham Act 
was to codify existing rights, not create new ones. See supra notes 134-35 and accom-
panying text. 
199 For purposes of this hypothetical, I intentionally ignore other possible remedies 
that Kodak may have against a user of Kodak in Nevada on tires. I do so to illustrate 
this point. That Kodak may have other avenues of redress in Nevada and that no such 
user has ever existed nor is likely to exist is further evidence in my mind that a federal 
dilution statute is unnecessary. 
200 Alfred C. Yen, Restaring the Natural Rights Law: Copyright as Labar and Possession, 
51 OHIO ST. LJ. 517 (1990). Although Yen uses the natural law theories to "restore" 
the natural rights justification for recognizing copyright protection, it is actually not 
well received. In fact, the United States Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Servo Co., pretty much signed the death warrant to this justification when it 
held that sweat of the brow or labor alone was no justification for copyright protec-
tion. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See Robert H. Rotsein, Beyond Metaphar: Copyright Infringe-
ment and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 725, 791 (1993); Brian R Landy, 
The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A Theury far Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody, 54 
OHIO ST. LJ. 227, 243 (1993) (noting that American copyright law does not recognize 
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tify dilution theory. 
The concept of "natural rights" originated with the Romans.201 
According to the Romans, the principle manner of acquiring prop-
erty rights in objects was occupancy.202 The first person to possess 
an object was said to have a natural right to own that object, provid-
ing it was not owned by someone else and was actually capable of 
ownership.203 The Romans defined things such as air, water, the 
sea, etc. as common to all and not subject to ownership by any 
single entity.204 
Therefore, the first person to physically possess a wild animal, 
for example, was said to own the wild animal provided that posses-
sion was continuous. However, because of the doctrine of ferae 
naturae, wild animals are considered to be inherently free, and 
once a wild animal escaped, it subsequently belonged only to the 
next person to physically possess it.205 
This approach to natural rights, as applied to intellectual 
property, would render even ideas themselves physically owned 
and, therefore, subject those ideas to property ownership by the 
first individual to conceive of them. The title granted would have 
to be in the idea itself, however manifested or not manifested, be-
cause the inventor/author was the first to conceive of the idea and, 
therefore, the first to possess it. 
Although they may not recognize it, the proponents of dilu-
tion theory implicitly embrace this justification for property owner-
ship in trademarks. Even though trademarks traditionally act like 
wild animals under Roman law-free for all to use except to the 
extent others have actually "captured" them and used them on 
products-the promoters of dilution must believe that the first to 
the natural right to own the product of one's labor). But see Wendy J. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellec-
tual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533, 1607 (1993) (stating that "[ilt remains to be seen 
whether the Supreme Court will be successful in its recent effort to oust free-floating 
labor theory from the jurisprudence of copyright."). 
201 See generally W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAw FROM AUGUSTUS TO 
JUSTINIAN (1990); RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND 
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAw (1970); H.F.JOLOWlCZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAw (1952). 
202 Yen, supra note 200, at 522. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 522-23. 
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occupy a famous or super trademark obtains property ownership to 
that mark as against all others. 
However, the fundamental flaw in this reasoning, as stated 
above, is that the mark itself is not subject to ownership, much like 
the wind, sea and air under Roman natural law. The better anal-
ogy to Roman law would be to the Roman doctrine of res com-
munes.206 The Romans believed that air was not subject to anyone 
person's exclusive ownership, except that each had the right to use 
air to breath.207 This would be the better natural law explanation 
of trademarks-that is, everyone has the right to use a trademark 
to the extent no one has used it before and only to the extent of 
his use. This is similar to res communes in that anyone has the right 
to breath air subject only to everyone else's equal right to breath it. 
Trademarks are similarly available to all, subject only to the rights 
of prior users. Subsequent users can use the marks provided they 
do so in a non-confusing manner. 
Dilution proponents appear to distort this natural law explana-
tion for intellectual property by classifying trademarks as intellec-
tual property subject to ownership on the same first-to-occupy basis 
as the Romans justified ownership of physical objects. Although 
the property model justifies much of the protection in intellectual 
property,208 it does not justify granting monopoly ownership to the 
underlying mark when the common law has been extremely reti-
cent to that notion. 
3. Locke209 
Although criticized,210 Locke's theory on property has also 
been used to justify recognizing rights in intellectual property.211 
At its most fundamental level, Locke's labor theory212 can be sum-
206 Id. at 522. 
207 Id. 
208 See Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theury. 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 581 (1993). 
209 An exhaustive presentation of Locke's justification for recognizing property is 
beyond the scope of this article. The following background is presented as general 
information to enable the reader to recognize how this justification is quietly at work 
in the minds of dilution proponents. 
210 Gordon, supra note 200; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 156 (1992). 
211 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 CEO. LJ. 287 (1988). 
212 See JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 3d ed. 
1988). 
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marized in Wendy Gordon's terms of "reap/sow."213 Only those 
who have sown an idea can reap the rewards of the idea. Tradition-
ally, however, Locke's theory is characterized in much more intui-
tively convincing terms. 
According to Locke's theory, recognizing property rights, is 
not justified by an empty reap/sow rhetoric, nor on the basis of 
merely the first to occupy (by thinking of) an idea.214 Rather, ac-
cording to Locke, all things are a grant from God and held in com-
mon by all people.215 However, in this stage they are not useful to 
anyone. Therefore, an individual exerts labor upon the object and 
transforms it into something useful and worthy of property owner-
ship. Because the individual exerted labor upon the thing, he or 
she should own it because without his or her labor, no one would 
be able to benefit from it.216 
This is more involved than simply planting a seed (Gordon's 
sowing) and after a period of time monopolizing the fruits 
(Gordon's reaping). The enticing part of Locke's theory is not 
merely a reap/sow logic where the object upon which work is ex-
tended is only meaningful to one. Rather, the normative aspect of 
Locke's theory is that property should be granted to the one who 
exerted labor upon the thing and to reward that person, thereby 
encouraging work and disclosure so that all can put the idea to use. 
This theory is most often used to justify granting patent rights 
to an inventor. This is better known as the bargain theory or the 
reward theory.217 The theory is that if rights to an invention are 
not granted, people would cease to invent (or at least not invent as 
much) and more importantly, they would cease to disclose because 
to disclose would be to lose control of the invention. Therefore, 
without this reward, society would suffer and the "progress of the 
sciences and useful arts, "218 the constitutional purpose of the pat-
ent and copyright statutes, would not be realized. 
However, this Lockean-based reward theory does not justify di-
213 Gordon, supra note 210. 
214 See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
215 See LOCKE, supra note 212, § 25, at 286. 
216 See Hughes, supra note 211, at 297. 
217 See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First 
Century, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1097, 1104-05 (1989); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977). 
218 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
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lution protection for trademarks. It is enticing because it does 
make intuitive sense; the trademark would be useless as an indica-
tor of source, quality and identification, if it had not been for the 
labor of the holder of the mark in the form of adopting and using 
the mark on the holder's goods or services.219 Therefore, to the 
extent one extends labor to lower the transaction costs for all, he 
or she should be rewarded and encouraged with expansive trade-
mark rights. 
The two main benefits to society by protecting trademarks are 
the provisions of accurate information and less expensive products. 
Consumers benefit by not being deceived as to the source of a 
good or service. Consumers also financially benefit because manu-
facturers can charge less for their products if manufacturers can 
use one, well-recognized trademark, rather than re-educating the 
consumer every time the consumer goes shopping for a product, 
such as Tide.220 Therefore, to provide some incentives to manufac-
turers to create trademarks does not appear to be a normatively 
negative concept.221 
However, the same bargain concept does not support dilution 
theory. In fact, because the trademark holder has not exerted any 
work on the mark as used on unrelated goods or services, it is un-
fair to create a monopoly in the mark and extend it beyond the 
holder's actual or intended use. For example, Hyatt Hotels has not 
exerted any work on the use of the mark HYATT as used on legal 
services.222 Because no work has been exerted by Hyatt Hotels, 
granting it an injunction to prevent the use of the term HYATT on 
legal services far exceeds the Locke justification for property. 
The Supreme Court has also .recently rejected the incentive 
theory for trademarks. In Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. ,223 
the Court stated: 
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law 
tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers 
219 From the law and economics perspective, if this labor results in an ability to 
lower transaction costs, it should be facilitated by trademark protection. See generaUy 
Landes & Posner, supra note 105. 
220 George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
221 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. 
222 See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984), em. denied, 
469 U.S. 1019 (1984). 
223 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that federal patent laws preempt state "plug-mold-
ing" statutes). 
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from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in 
the creation of 'quasi-property rights' in communicative sym-
bols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the pro-
tection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.224 
4. Hegel225 
475 
The Hegelian concept of property as a unique mechanism for 
self-actualization and recognition of an individual person226 is also 
used by some to justify granting rights in intellectual property.227 
However, the so-called Hegelian justification does not satisfactorily 
explain granting dilution protection rights to trademark holders. 
According to Hegel, property is the vehicle by which the 
supreme human will actualizes its personality. Only when human 
will is translated to an external sphere from the self does it exist.228 
The "[p]ersonality is the first, still wholly abstract, determination of 
the absolute and infinite will .... "229 
Much of Hegel's concept of property furthers Locke's labor 
theory-the first to occupy an object or exert labor upon it should 
own it. Hegel, however, saw possession as merely the first step. 
Hegel saw three ways in which the will may occupy an object: by 
physically taking control of it; by imposing a form upon it; and by 
marking it.230 
To Hegel, mere initial possession is not sufficient to retain 
property rights in an object in perpetuity. Rather, the will's right 
to occupy an object is maintained as long as the will manifests itself 
in the object by using it or otherwise marking it as its own. 
Although Hegel does not require actual use to satisfy the require-
ment that the will manifest itself in the object, some objective indi-
224 [d. at 157. See also Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 
(2d Cir. 1917) (holding that a plaintiff may not monopolize a trademark). 
225 An exhaustive presentation of Hegel's justification of property is beyond the 
scope of this article. The following general background is presented to enable the 
reader to see other philosophical justifications that may be used in attempting to 
justifY a federal dilution statute. 
226 GEORGE W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, 45 (T.M. Knox trans., 
1978) (stating that the individual demonstrates ownership of property by imposing 
his will upon it and thereby occupying it). 
227 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 211, at 330. 
228 [d. at 331. 
229 HEGEL, supra note 226, , 41. 
230 [d. 1. 54. 
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cation of the will's interest in the object is required.231 
This personality justification for property is considered open-
ended.232 According to Hegel, as long as the will is objectively 
marking an object as its own and not abandoning it, it continues to 
manifest itself in the object and therefore is property of the 
individual. 233 
Hegel seems to have been perplexed at the justification of pro-
tection of intellectual property. Because intellectual property for 
Hegel was in the form of "mental aptitudes, erudition, artistic skill, 
inventions and so forth,"234 and because its true nature was "inward 
and mental," he hesitated to call these things property. Rather, 
Hegel focused on justification of what is referred to today as the 
"first sale doctrine"235 in copyrights, which means that authors may 
alienate titles to specific works but retain all rights to make copies 
of the work or derive other works from it.236 
Hegel's solution to this problem is to call the act of copying 
the work one of the "universal ways and means of expression" that 
belongs to the author.237 Therefore, the buyer purchases the work 
for the sole purpose of incorporating the ideas embodied in the 
work into himself. The author sells the work for that purpose only. 
In this way, Hegel justifies protection of intellectual property as an 
expression of the self and the self as manifested in the object. As 
long as the will is manifested in the object, the author could claim 
it as his. 
The Hegelianjustification for trademarks is even more attenu-
231 See Hughes, supra note 211, at 334-35. 
232 Id. (citing Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 987 
(1982». 
233 Hegel recognized that the extreme subjectivity of this expression is unhealthy. 
Id. at 335. 
234 Id. at 337. 
235 In copyright jurisprudence, the first sale doctrine is the notion that unless ex-
pressly provided to the contrary by contract, when someone purchases a work, they do 
not purchase the underlying title in the copyright to the work. That is, the copyright 
title and the work title are severable. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1993). See also H.R. REp. 
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1976) ("This does not mean that conditions on 
future disposition of copies or phonorecords, imposed by a contract between their 
buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a breach of contract, 
but it does mean that they could not be enforced by an action for infringement of 
copyright.") . 
236 See Hughes, supra note 211, at 338. 
237 HEGEL, supra note 226, 1 69. 
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ated. One commentator, Justin Hughes, states that because the 
trademark right is a right of expression for the manufacturer, not a 
right of the consumer to receive information, trademarks fulfill the 
recognition aspect of Hegel's personality theory of property be-
cause they provide the means of securing respect and recognition 
to the first person who appropriates and uses the mark.238 
Nevertheless, a Hegelian-type justification for dilution is not 
appealing. The Hegelian justification for dilution would require 
that the first-user have the right to continue occupying the mark 
even though that may have negative implications for others. To 
Hegel, recognition of any property may have negative implications 
on the subjective will of others. Therefore, granting dilution rights 
to a trademark holder is in line with the greater subjectivity prob-
lem found in all of property law. 
However, neither Hegel's justification of property nor 
Hughes' explanation of Hegel's justification for trademarks satis-
factorily supports recognition of dilution rights in a trademark 
holder. 
There are three competing objectives of trademark law, not 
one as Hughes says. The first is to protect the goodwill of the 
trademark holder. The second is to protect the consumer from 
confusion. The third is to protect the innocent defendant, as well 
as uninvolved third parties. To grant dilution rights presupposes 
that the goodwill of the trademark holder is analogous to the 
supreme will of Hegel's individual to which all else is subservient. 
This has not been the case in trademark jurisprudence. Any 
rational justification must include and balance all three legitimate 
elements equally. Dilution theory subjugates the interests of the 
third party to those of the trademark holder. Hegel'S personality 
justification of continued occupation of an object analogously justi-
fies recognition of a trademark holder's right to exclude others 
from confusing usage; however, it does not justify excluding non-
confusing uses. 
The will of the third party should not be subservient to the will 
of the trademark holder. All should be treated equally. Therefore, 
2SB See Hughes, supra note 211, at 354. As many of the intellectual property com-
mentators contend, Hughes chooses one of the three goals of protecting intellectual 
property and gives it undue weight vis-a-vis the other two. Of course, the Supreme 
Court in Bonito Boats sharply disagrees with Hughes' analysis on this point. See Bonito 
Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). 
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party B has just as much right to occupy a trademark and exclude 
others from using it on legal seIVices as party A had in adopting it 
and using it on hotels. To say that the subjective will of party A in 
this scenario should be recognized to any extent it deems necessary 
subjugates the will of all subsequent third parties far beyond what 
is justifiable under "the unseen hand of the personality justi-
fication. "239 
Party A may continue to manifest its will to occupy the trade-
mark HYATT for use on hotels, but that subjective will cannot pos-
sibly manifest itself so thatJoel Hyatt knows not to adopt the same 
mark for use on legal seIVices. Hyatt Hotels may continue to oc-
cupy HYATT, but how can it physically or otherwise occupy HYATT 
for legal seIVices when it has never used nor intends to use the 
mark in such a manner. The "control" Hegel speaks of could only 
be satisfied with a statutory grant of a monopoly in the trademark 
in the form of a dilution statute. To do so would be to create a 
"queer branch [ ] of our jurisprudence" that only exists because of 
"an exception depending upon statute."240 
5. Gordon 
A more contemporary theorist, Wendy J. Gordon, has posited 
what she presents as one justification for recognizing intellectual 
property rights. Gordon calls her model "Malcompetitive Copy-
ing."241 Under the Gordon model, recovery for infringement of an 
intangible is limited as follows: (1) defendant must knowingly copy 
an eligible intangible; (2) such copying must cause asymmetrical 
market failure; (3) such copying must take sales specifically "from 
plaintiff's actual or expected market;" and (4) defendant's use 
must be more valuable than plaintiff's over the long run.242 
Gordon defines an eligible intangible as a product that is: (1) 
deliberately created or produced in excess of any "legal duty and 
with an expectation of either reward or control;" (2) clearly gives 
notice to third parties that it is owned as such; and (3) "otherwise 
239 Hughes, supra note 211, at 353. 
240 Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration o/Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 932 (1939). 
241 Gordon, supra note 210, at 222. Although it is clear from the text that Gordon 
intends her model to apply to copyrights, my application of her model to dilution is 
intended to make the point that none of the current or past models justifying intellec-
tual property protection justifies dilution. 
242 Id. at 222-23. 
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suitable for trading in a market context where the seller's leverage 
is provided by a judicially imposed duty."243 
If these elements are satisfied (except for the final element), 
Gordon claims that traditional restitutionary notions justify recov-
ery for the plaintiff. If the elements are not satisfied, recovery for 
the infringement of an intellectual property right should not be 
compensable. Gordon's model, however, does not provide any 
justification for recognizing trademark dilution rights. 
To specifically test Gordon's model as a justification for dilu-
tion, consider Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 
Inc., where dilution recovery was denied.244 Analyzing Mead Data 
using Gordon's model for recognizing restitutionary impulses in 
intellectual property discloses other theoretical weaknesses in dilu-
tion rationale. 
In 1988, Mead Data filed suit against Toyota Motors to attempt 
to enjoin Toyota'S use of LEXUS on luxury automobiles.245 Mead 
Data's mark, LEXIS, probably would constitute an "eligible intangi-
ble" under Gordon's model. LEXIS was deliberately created by 
Mead Data in excess of any legal duty to do so. Mead Data was not 
required to use or adopt any trademark, let alone this specific one. 
In fact, many manufacturers that do adopt and use trademarks do 
so with either an expectation of reward or control of the mark. 
Therefore, a reasonable conclusion is that Mead Data adopted the 
mark LEXIS with the expectation of reward in the form of con-
sumer recognition, enhanced sales and an assurance marker for 
consumers regarding quality. 
Mead Data's expectation of control of the mark LEXIS is, how-
ever, rather precarious. Most manufacturers that adopt a trade-
mark believe that it is a monopoly on use of the word. Only 
sophisticated manufacturers with experience in trademarks realize 
the common law significance of the rule that protection is con-
trolled by prior appropriation and use and only to the extent the 
mark is used. That is, under common law, Mead Data's control of 
the mark would exclude others from use only to the extent that 
243 [d. at 223. 
244 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
245 [d. 
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consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods 
or seIVices. 
Whether Mead Data expected control really seems irrelevant. 
Many people expect things from the law; however, an expectation 
of the law has never been a factor nullifying the existence of con-
trary precedent. Therefore, whether Mead Data expected control 
seems irrelevant to the inquiry. Clearly, Mead Data, or any trade-
mark holder, adopts a mark for purposes of reward and, therefore, 
this should satisfy Gordon's definition of an eligible intangible. 
Furthermore, LEXIS can easily be demarcated as "owned"246 by the 
trademark holder by using the symbol R or TM as appropriate. 
Although LEXIS may constitute an eligible intangible under 
Gordon's model, one is not likely to prevail in a dilution cause of 
action under her regime. First, it is a circular and open issue 
whether Toyota "knew" it was copying the LEXIS trademark when 
they adopted LEXUS. Although there was testimony in the record 
that Toyota was aware of the existence of LEXIS, its trademark at-
torneys advised them that the existence of LEXIS registration for 
use on computerized data retrieval seIVices did not bar Toyota'S 
adoption of LEXUS.247 
Under Gordon's model, the defendant must have known he 
was copying from the plaintiff before Gordon would find liability. 
The reasoning for this is to preserve fairness, avoid harming the 
defendant and preserving his autonomy, and to further the societal 
goal of preseIVing markets.248 
Therefore, even though the district court clearly established 
that Toyota "knew" of the LEXIS mark, because of the technical 
differences, the court found that Toyota did not "knowingly use" 
the mark. This circular analysis is no more helpful than saying that 
if the mark was likely to cause confusion, it must have been similar. 
Gordon's next element, "asymmetrical market failure,"249 is 
also not likely to be satisfied in a dilution cause of action. "Asym-
246 I am uncomfortable with this aspect of Gordon's model because a trademark is 
not subject to property ownership the way a copyright is. I suppose that for this rea-
son, I could make the argument that a trademark is not even an eligible intangible. 
As this would not further the attempt at applying Gordon's model to dilution, I shall 
resist the temptation. 
247 Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1028. 
248 Gordon, supra note 210, at 230-33. 
249 Gordon, supra note 210, at 230. 
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metrical market failure" is defined as conduct by the defendant 
that precludes plaintiff from market access. Although on its face 
this seems intuitively to support or justifY a dilution cause of action, 
on further analysis it becomes plain that this is not the case. 
If Toyota's actions in adopting LEXUS precluded Mead Data 
from market access in use of its mark LEXIS, all would agree that 
Mead Data deserves compensation. However, the issue is how to 
define "market." The market for a copyright or patent, for exam-
ple, is unlimited. The market for a trademark is limited to the 
goods or services on which the mark has been used (or a market 
that is a natural extension from the original market). Therefore, 
by asymmetrical market failure, the issue is not whether Toyota'S 
use of LEXUS precludes Mead Data from using the mark LEXIS 
on automobiles, but rather whether Toyota's actions preclude 
Mead Data from using its mark on computerized data retrieval 
services. Even for dilution analysis, the issue is not the lessening of 
distinctiveness in all markets, but rather the mark holder's market. 
Once again, the market for the trademark is not at large. The 
defined parameters of the trademark are only the extent to which 
the plaintiff has used the mark or to which he is naturally going to 
expand use or intention of use. Prior appropriation of a mark in 
one "market" does not and should not give the holder monopolis-
tic rights in all "markets." 
Therefore, neither Mead Data, nor any trademark dilution 
plaintiff, could have been the victim of asymmetrical market failure 
because Mead Data made no sales in defendant's market and had 
no intention of doing so. A standard trademark infringement 
plaintiff is the perfect example of asymmetrical market failure. Be-
cause of the conduct of an infringer, the plaintiff would be pre-
cluded from entering a specific region of the country. For 
example, although the plaintiff had obtained prior rights to a mark 
for nation-wide use by registering the mark, the defendant had 
commenced use of the mark in that specific region. Unless the 
defendant was enjoined, the plaintiff would be precluded from 
that market. This is precisely asymmetrical market failure. 
The next element from Gordon's model requires that the de-
fendant have taken sales from the plaintiff's actual or intended 
market.250 However, a dilution plaintiff never suffers from any 
250 Gordon, supra note 210, at 238-48. 
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quantifiable damage and a dilution defendant never takes away a 
single sale that could have been made by the plaintiff. 
One possible argument to satisfy this element would be that by 
selling vehicles under the mark LEXUS, Toyota took sales from 
Mead Data in the form of reducing the ability of consumers to 
identify LEXIS with Mead Data and raising the cost Mead Data 
would incur to educate consumers, thereby causing them a loss in 
sales. 
Therefore, neither Locke's labor theory, Hegel's property jus-
tification, nor Gordon's makompetitive copying model justify rec-
ognizing a trademark holder's rights to prevent use by third parties 
in a manner not likely to confuse or specifically harm the trade-
mark holder. 
6. The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights 
Courts have been particularly irrational in the increasingly ex-
pansive view that they have given to recognizing intellectual prop-
erty rights. Since 1987, federal courts have greatly enhanced 
recognition of trademark rights with a mighty "unseen hand" of 
Locke's theory of prior occupation.251 
Even though there has been a well accepted history that colors 
alone could not be appropriated as trademarks,252 in 1993, the 
Eighth Circuit held that color alone could be a trademark if the 
mark had obtained secondary meaning.253 This holding is particu-
larly interesting because only two years earlier, considering the 
same blue color, but used on a different product, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that color alone could never attain trademark status re-
251 See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
252 See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 
1906), cert. denied, 203 U.S. 589 (1906) (holding that color cannot be monopolized to 
distinguish a product); James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, Inc., 128 
F.2d 6, 9 (6th Cir. 1942) (holding that color is not subject to trademark monopoly 
except in connection with some definite arbitrary symbol or design). There are vari-
ous reasons generally relied upon for denying color alone trademarks including: (1) 
if one color is adopted by one competitor, it will deplete the range of choices other 
competitors have to effectively market the same good with a different trademark; and 
(2) courts and juries cannot distinguish between shades and scarce judicial resources 
would be wasted trying to make a rule regarding how close a shade of a color could 
come before it would infringe. NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d lO24, lO27 
(7th Cir. 1990). See also Craig Summerfield, Color as a Trademark and the Mere Color 
Rule: The Circuit Split For Color Alone, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 973 (1993). 
253 Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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gardless of how much secondary meaning it had obtained.254 
Furthermore, in 1992, the Supreme Court held that the inside 
of a restaurant could be an inherently distinctive trademark and 
thus not require secondary meaning to be enforced as valid trade 
dress against a copier.255 
This new and expansive receptivity (if not generation) of 
trademark rights is only explained by a new receptivity to Locke's 
unseen hand of natural rights. Today, courts are expanding trade-
mark protection radically beyond past levels. Years of common law 
regarding color depletion and shade confusion notwithstanding, 
the Eighth Circuit granted trademark protection in the color blue 
as used on leader tape in VCR cassettes.256 What changed so radi-
cally? Only the courts receptivity to the idea that because the plain-
tiff exerted work upon the color blue, the plaintiff's ownership 
and monopolization of that color used on those goods could be 
justified. 
Mter years of common law that struggled to recognize trade 
dress protection in the first place,257 where trade dress was re-
quired to be nonfunctional and have secondary meaning before it 
could be enforced against an alleged copier,258 what has changed? 
254 See Nutrasweet Co. v. Studt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 1990). 
255 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753,2761 (1992). 
256 Master Distribs., 986 F.2d at 224. 
257 One of the earlier "trade dress" cases found that ornamental designs or other 
trade dress features could not be inherently distinctive and therefore could not func-
tion as a source indicating trademark. In re Burgess Batteries, 112 F.2d 820, 822 
(C.C.P.A. 1940). 
258 Trade dress is the overall visual impression of a product or provision of services. 
Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1989); Roulo v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1989). Courts have traditionally held 
that labels, packages and product designs may all constitute trade dress. Freixnet 
S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984); Ambrit, Inc. v. 
Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1983); T.G.1. Friday's, Inc. v. International 
Restaurant Group, 405 F. Supp. 698, 708 (M.D. La. 1975), afJ'd, 569 F.2d 895, 899 
(5th Cir. 1978). Most courts have determined that trade dress can be protected only 
if it is non-functional and possesses secondary meaning. Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia 
Telcom Group, 900 F.2d 1546,1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville 
Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1989); Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 
512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1989); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasatar, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 
1987); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,974 (2d Cir. 1987); Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Sprint Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,517 (lOth Cir. 1987); First Brands Corp. v. 
Fred Myer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987); American Home Prods. Corp. v. 
Barr Lab., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1987); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-
Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart 
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Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, 
Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); Freixnet S.A. v. 
Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984); Litton Sys., Inc. v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444-45 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Industria Arredamenti 
Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1984); Warner Bros. v. 
Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327,332. (2d Cir. 1983); Harland v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 
F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 
772 (9th Cir. 1981); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299,303 
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 
F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & 
Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 
366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980); Truck Equip. Servo V. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1217 
(8th Cir. 1976); Audio Fidelity, Inc. V. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 
555 (9th Cir. 1960); Tas-T-Nut CO. V. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3,6 (6th Cir. 
1957); Pagliero V. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339,342 (9th Cir. 1952); Rally's Inc. V. 
International Shortstop, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 451, 453 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Wallace Infl 
Silversmiths, Inc. V. Godinger Silverart Co., 735 F. Supp. 141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 
Second Earth Enter. V. Allstar Prod. Mktg. Co., 717 F. Supp. 302, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1989); 
White Swan Ltd. V. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 729 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (N.D. Cal. 1989); 
San Francisco Mercantile CO. V. Beeba's Creations, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1005, 1007-08 
(C.D. Cal. 1988); Hartford House Ltd. V. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 
1537 (D. Colo. 1986); Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. V. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 72, 77 
(N.D. Tex. 1984); Warehouse Restaurant, Inc. V. Customs House Restaurant, Inc., 217 
U.S.P.Q. 411, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Black & Decker Mfg. CO. V. Ever-Ready Appliance 
Mfg. Co., 518 F. Supp. 607, 615-16 (E.D. Mo. 1981); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. V. Interna-
tional Restaurant Group, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 698, 708-09 (M.D. La. 1975). A minority 
of opinions have developed, however, that do not require a showing of secondary 
meaning if the trade dress is inherently distinctive. Roulo V. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 
F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989); Schwinn Bicycle CO. V. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 
1176,1183 n.13 (7th Cir. 1989); Vaughn Mfg. CO. V. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 
348 (7th CiT. 1987); Blau Plumbing, Inc. V. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. V. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 425 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1986); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & CO. V. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Ambrit, Inc. V. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1983); Chevron Chern., 
CO. V. Voluntary Purch. Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1980); Alexander 
Binzel Corp. V. Nu-Tecsys Corp., 785 F. Supp. 719, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Fashion Vic-
tim Ltd. V. Sunrise Turquoise, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Storck, 
L.P. V. Farley Candy Co., No. 92C0552, 1992 WL 18796, *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27,1992); 
Remcraft Lighting Prods., Inc. V. Maxim Lighting, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989); Bloomfield Ind., Div. of Speciality Equip. CO. V. Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 
716 F. Supp. 380, 385 (N.D. Ind. 1989); Philip Morris, Inc. V. Midwest Tobacco, Inc., 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1213 (E.D. Va. 1988); Haan Crafts Corp. V. Craft Masters, Inc., 683 
F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Blue Coral, Inc. V. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. 
Supp. 1153, 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Some courts have held that the interiors of restau-
rants can be protected under trade dress analysis. Prufrock Ltd. V. Lasatar, 781 F.2d 
129, 132 (8th Cir. 1987); Fuddruckers, Inc. V. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d. 837, 
842-43 (9th Cir. 1987); Rally's Inc. V. International Shortstop, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 451, 
453 (E.D.Ark. 1990); Taj Mahal Enters. V. Trump, 745 F. Supp. 240, 252 (D.NJ. 
1990); Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. V. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 72, 75-75 (N.D. Tex. 
1984); Warehouse Restaurant, Inc. V. Customs House Restaurant, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 
411,415-16 (N.D. Cal. 1982); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. V. International Restaurant Group, 
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Clearly, courts are more receptive to Locke's unseen hand. Today, 
if an individual is first to occupy a trademark through use, regard-
less of the form of the trademark, or ancient common law doc-
trines to the contrary, he or she is much more likely to prevail than 
ten years ago. 
The unseen hand of Locke is also guiding the dilution theory 
proponents. Under proposed section 43(c), the first to occupy a 
mark and exert enough labor upon that mark to make it "famous" 
(whatever that means) will be rewarded with a "super trademark" 
that is valid against others on an almost monopolistic level. More-
over, because of this, a federal cause of action for dilution is then 
only "natural." 
Even though Locke's unseen hand seems to be clearly at work 
in the expansion of trademark rights, the Supreme Court in Feist 
Publicati0'T1S59 clearly and unequivocally disposed of the pure labor 
theory as justification for copyright. In that case, the Supreme 
Court held that "sweat of the brow" alone could not be justification 
for granting copyrights in a telephone book.260 However, dilution 
proponents would have us believe that "sweat of the brow" alone is 
justification for recognizing rights in color, the inside of restau-
rants and so-called diluted trademarks. 
7. Dilution Creates Copyrights in the Idea of the 
Trademark 
As stated above, Middleton provided one of the better criti-
cisms of trademark dilution theory to date.261 Middleton's argu-
ment essentially provided that expanding trademark rights to 
include an injunction against dilution would create a copyright in 
the trademark itself, thus prohibiting others from copying and us-
ing it regardless of whether they were in competition. Actually, 
Middleton was exactly on the right line of thought but did not go 
405 F. Supp. 698, 709 (M.D. La. 1975), all'd. 569 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978). How-
ever, until 1991, all of these courts had held that restaurant interiors could not be 
protected unless they had secondary meaning. Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 133; Fuddmckers, 
826 F.2d. at 843-44; RaUy's, 776 F. Supp. at 453; Taj Maha~ 745 F. Supp. at 252; Freddie 
Fuddruckers, 589 F. Supp. at 78; WaTl1house, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 415; Friday's, 405 F. Supp. at 
708-09. I am greatly indebted to David Burgess (Chicago-Kent, '94) for his research 
assistance regarding this issue. 
259 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
260 [d. at 354. 
261 See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying texL 
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far enough. Dilution not only attempts to protect a mark as if 
copyrightable subject matter, it, in fact, also grants a copyright in 
the idea of the trademark in the minds of the consumer. 
A copyright subsists in a work immediately upon the fixation 
of that work in a tangible means of expression. 262 Until the work is 
fixed in a tangible means of expression, no copyright exists and, 
therefore, cannot justifiably be claimed.263 The objective of this 
rule is to support the underlying proposition that one should not 
be able to copyright ideas, just the expression of ideas.264 There-
fore, if an individual has an idea for a book and does not write it 
down, tape it, or otherwise fix it, he or she may not claim copyright 
infringement if others appropriate the idea. 
In copyright law, this is known as the ideal expression dichot-
omy.265 The idea is never protected; the expression is protected to 
the extent it is original and tangibly fixed. 
Copyright law does not grant protection for the idea in the 
abstract, but only the expression of the idea in the form of the 
actual work or invention to prohibit granting monopolies for 
which society receives nothing in return. Monopolies in ideas in 
the abstract or monopolies in information run counter to all justifi-
cation of intellectual property protection. 
A federal statute protecting "super trademarks"266 from dilu-
tion would create a copyright in the mark itself, as well as in the 
abstract idea of the mark in the minds of the consumer and manu-
facturers. Because dilution theory would prevent even non-com-
petitors from using the mark even in non-confusing ways, the 
copyright in the mark is more extensive thanjust the expression of 
the mark itself. Rather, it extends to the idea of the mark in the 
minds of the consumer and other manufacturers even in abstract 
form. Under dilution theory, the trademark holder not only con-
trols each expression of the mark, but also attempts to control the 
manner in which consumers or other manufacturers perceive of 
262 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1993). 
263 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879). 
264 [d. 
265 See generally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,202-
03 (2d Cir. 1983). 
266 Proposed section 43(c) would create a class of "super trademarks." Only these 
super trademarks would be registrable and capable of being diluting under section 
43(c). See Gilson, supra note 3, at 117 
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the mark. In this matter, dilution theory attempts a monopoliza-
tion of the idea of the work even outside of any use. In that re-
spect, dilution theory violates the ideal expression dichotomy. 
V. Conclusion 
A federal dilution statute in the form of an amendment to the 
Lanham Act, such as proposed section 43(c), although most likely 
inevitable at this point in time, would grossly expand the common 
law concept of trademark as our system has recognized it for hun-
dreds of years. There are numerous practical stumbling blocks to 
such a statute that need to be satisfied. 
There is also no satisfactory theoretical justification support-
ing a federal dilution cause of action. Gordon's model does not 
support it because it is impossible to say that a junior user "took" 
sales from the senior trademark user. Hegel's theory of property as 
actualizing the self does not justify dilution because Hegel requires 
some continued occupation of the object to maintain rights in the 
object. Because the trademark owner does not occupy the mark as 
used on non-competing goods in non-confusing ways, Hegel'S justi-
fication also does not support dilution. 
Clearly at work, however, is the unseen hand of Locke. 
Courts, as well as dilution proponents, are re-embracing Locke's 
labor theory of property-to exert work on an object means owner-
ship of that object. Although this explains the dilution theory sup-
ported by proponents, it does not justify dilution. Locke's labor 
theory does not support granting dilution rights to a trademark 
holder because the trademark holder has not exerted any work 
upon the mark as used on non-competing and non-confusing 
goods or services. To say that only grants a government subsidized 
monopoly in the mark to the first comer, regardless of use of that 
mark. This is absolutely contrary to our system of trademark juris-
prudence.267 This is the price we pay for our common law system 
based upon use. Because there is no property in the mark itself, 
holders of marks must carve out their market and maintain their 
mark's distinctiveness based upon their use. 
267 The court in Anheuser-Busch explained; .. [t] here must also be a reasonable basis 
for the public to attribute the particular product or service of another to the source of 
the goods associated with the famous mark. To hold otherwise would result in recog-
nizing a right in gross, which is contrary to principles of trademark law." Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. Major Mud & Chern. Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1191, 1194 (T.T.A.B. 1984). 
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Federal statutes should not be used to grant remedies where 
there are no wrongs, nor grant monopolies in trademarks. For as 
Learned Hand wrote, 
the plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false 
representations that those are his wares which in fact are not, 
but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however, tri-
fling. The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plain-
tiff's goods slavishly down to the minutest detail; but he may not 
represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.268 
268 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917). 
